




**Dimensions**  
for Strategic Studies

**Position Assessment**



# **The Wagner Rebellion**

Its causes and its internal and external repercussions

by:Ahmad Dahshan

July 2023

[www.dimensionscenter.net](http://www.dimensionscenter.net)





**Dimensions**  
for Strategic Studies

Dimensions Centre for Strategic Studies (DCSS) is think tank, dedicated to the study of the Middle East and North Africa affairs, provides the Arab readers with a substantive insight on the region's political, economic and social issues and dynamics.

The DCSS was founded in the United Kingdom on January 1, 2020, and is headquartered in London.

Dimensions Center for Strategic Studies is interested in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) affairs in particular, addressing influences the region has and the effects of this region's interactions with the rest of the world.

We strive to provide an open and accessible space in order to inform relevant persons of experts and academic readers alike, in a simplified style far from the complexities brought by experts, technicians and academics.

We are keen to provide topics in an intensive manner that goes in line with the challenges of modern times and in brief way which can meet the needs of researchers and readers as well.

<https://dimensionscenter.net/>

---

All rights Reserved DCSS.2023  
info@dimensionscenter.net



## Preamble

In 2014, following Russia's annexation of Crimea and the start of its armed rebellion by its allies in the Donbass region of southeastern Ukraine, the first appearance of the Russian paramilitary group Wagner began<sup>(1)</sup>. Then came reports of the emergence of the armed group in several other hotspots around the world, specifically in: Syria, Venezuela, the province of Kosovo, and some countries of the African Sahel<sup>(2)</sup>.

The military operation launched by Russia against Ukraine provided a new opportunity for the Wagner group to jump to the forefront of events, as it entered the line of confrontation in the Bakhmut region of the Donbas region, and made field progress in the region. The group then gained local and international attention after its gradual escalation against the official Russian military institution by accusing the military leaders of treason. In June 2023 such a move turned into an armed rebellion launched from the southern city of Rostov<sup>(3)</sup>, with the aim of entering Moscow and overthrowing the Minister of Defence and the Chief of Staff.

Although the Wagner rebellion ended just a day after it was announced; and the Belarusian President Lukashenko interfered and mediated, the incident raised questions about Putin's internal control and the general implications of what happened.

In this report, we discuss the reasons that led to the Wagner Group rebellion, and prompted it to move militarily and enter the capital Moscow. We also review the impact of the group's rebellion on Putin's internal authority, and the potential effects on Russia's foreign influence.

(1) By: Stanislav Iasynskyi-Wagner mercenaries: what we know about Putin's private army in Donbas - Euromaidan Press - [Online] - 2017/10/19, link

Stanislav Yasinsky: Putin's private army What Ukrainians should know about Wagner, whose fighters are fighting in Donbass, the publishing house of the European square "Ukraine" - October 19, 2017.

(2) By: Paul STRONSKI - Russia's Growing Footprint in Africa's Sahel Region - Carnegie Endowment for International Peace - [Online] - February 28, 2023, link

Paul Stronsky: Russia's Growing Footprint in the Sahel - Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, February 28, 2023

(3) Wagner Group leader claims control of Russian military positions in Rostov, BBC, 23 June 2023, link



## First: Causes of the Wagner Rebellion

Prigozhin has thriving investments in Russia, and a presence in more than a dozen countries around the world. He deals directly with the leaders of countries and armed factions, costs the treasury of the Russian state little, and he earns millions of dollars by acquiring natural resources that are resold and recycled through his network of companies. Prigozhin gives the Kremlin geopolitical influence without bearing major burdens. According to this equation, a win-win "servant" and/or "integrative" relationship arose.

Prigozhin abroad was characterized as the "master" of the situation, the decision-maker in concluding deals, and the manager of military conflicts, as there is no direct presence of troops from the Russian army<sup>(4)</sup>. Even in the case of Syria, the Russian military presence was limited to aviation, and infantry military police troops for guarding, without the presence of official Russian combat troops on the ground to compete or clash with them for authority and plans.

The war option in Ukraine wasn't attractive to Prigozhin; because; first, this option disrupted his plans for overseas expansion at a time when his forces in Africa were in high demand, and he found himself at the mercy of the Russian Ministry of Defence, second. However; he was forced to engage in this battle as a tax to be paid to the Kremlin, in exchange for the privileges he received.

After it became clear that the plans for a rapid "takeover" of Ukraine had failed, and that the war would be prolonged, Prigozhin resorted to the option of expanding the recruitment of prisoners, so that he would not have to call up his forces from abroad and lose his positions and wealth. Precisely at this point, the first clashes with the army leadership began, when the latter decided to take advantage of the "law" of amnesty for prisoners in exchange for engaging in combat in Ukraine, to sign contracts with the army, which prompted Prigozhin to announce in February 2023, the "time of recruitment of prisoners for the Wagner Group", as a result of the army's competition for this human resource<sup>(5)</sup>.

(4) Авторы: Ольга Евшина, Анастасия Ботарева и Сергей Боряшко- Бойная сила: как Минобороны России вербует заключенных из колоний - BBC News - [Online] -3мая 2023, link  
Report: Olga Ivshina, Anastasia Lutareva and Sergei Goryashko: How does the Russian Defense Ministry recruit prisoners? BBC - May 3, 2023.

(5) Автор: Алиса Андреева - Бвгений Пригофин заявил о прекращении набора заключенных в БВК «Вагнер» - [Online] - Базета - 09 февраля 2023, link  
Report: Alyssa Andreeva: Yevgeny Prigozhin announces the end of the recruitment of prisoners in the military company "Wagner" - Gazeta "Russia" - February 9, 2023.





Despite all the reports circulating about Prigozhin's relationship with the Wagner Group, there was no physical evidence of this connection. The man continued to deny it, but with Russia starting the war in Ukraine, he was summoned to participate in it. Denying this no longer makes sense. It actually led him to declare explicitly on September 26, 2022, that he "co-founded Wagner from the first moment, and is leading it." <sup>(6)</sup>

This situation put further pressure on Prigozhin. It closed the doors before him in the rest of the world, and made him a prisoner to the Russian bureaucracy. He simply lost the flexibility he enjoyed before.

Since May 2022, Prigozhin has been attacking the leadership of the Russian army, represented by the Minister of Defence and the Chief of Staff. He even ridiculed and insulted them with profanity. Nevertheless, the Kremlin did not intervene and refused to rebuke Prigozhin for that, or even ask him to stop it. The strangest matter happened when the Kremlin spokesman, Dmitry Peskov, wanted to highlight the "patriotism" of his family. He made his son Nikolai Peskov volunteer to fight in Ukraine, but under the umbrella of the Wagner Group, and not within the ranks of the Russian army, at a time when Prigozhin's attack on army commanders intensified <sup>(7)</sup>.

The announcement was interpreted as a signal of support from the Kremlin for Wagner, giving Prigozhin more boldness to criticize the military leadership.

Since September 2022, the Russian military has not achieved any military success on the ground, and in all the successes that have been achieved after this date, whether by acquiring new lands, or repelling Ukrainian attacks, the credit was given to Wagner. This situation angered Shoigu and Gerasimov over Prigozhin. They might have been jealous of him, as criticism of the official military by Russian activists and nationalist supporters of the war intensified. And they always praised Wagner's forces, especially as the losses of the Russian army increased, and it was subjected to significant blows from the Ukrainian army <sup>(8)</sup>.

(6) Автор: Болос Америки - Пригофин признал, что основал ВК «Вагнер» - [Online] - 26 Сентябрь, 2022, Link Report: Voice of America-Prigozhin acknowledges founding Wagner Group - September 26, 2022.

(7) Косарев опубликовал фото сына Пескова ва ва ва ва в в в в ВВК "Вагнер" - Московский Комсомолец - [Online]-22.04.2023, link

Report: Emma Gribova: Portrait of Peskov's son in "Wagner" - Moskovsky Komsomolets newspaper "Russia" - April 22, 2023.

(8) Anger in Russia after a painful Ukrainian strike, Al Jazeera Net, 3 June 2023, link



This apparently led the army leadership to delay the delivery of weapons and ammunition to Prigozhin. He was subjected to a great deal of harassment, and to pressure from the army on the Kremlin to fully integrate the Wagner Group, which is fighting in Ukraine. Prigozhin considered that a challenge to him and to his authority by Shoigu and Gerasimov. He viewed that as a first step in the way of getting rid of him, and the full acquisition of Wagner and its activities in the rest of the world, not only Ukraine<sup>(9)</sup>.

Shoigu and Gerasimov's decision to put pressure on Wagner, in addition to another reason not mentioned above, is the growing influence of Prigozhin in the media inside Russia; as he was just a marginal figure in Russian before the war. His name is often mentioned in Western newspapers, and the Russians have no interest in following his news. After the war, however, Prigozhin became the focus of attention in Russian, with a popularity only challenged by Putin. He was seen as an example of the national figure reflecting and expressing the "conscience of society"; and he was biased to the general public against the oligarchy benefiting from the Kremlin, which proved to be powerless at the time of confrontation<sup>(10)</sup>. It is also no secret that Prigozhin was able to buy the loyalty of many military correspondents, who turned to promote him and Wagner instead of promoting the army and its leadership, which weakened Shoigu much in light of the disrespect and hatred of a large segment of the professional military within the army; because they see him as someone who is not qualified to command. Shoigu represents a significant weight given that his political age predates that of Putin's by several years, as he has held important leadership positions since 1978<sup>(11)</sup>. He also has behind him a major interest group that sees him as their representative to an authority that should be kept. This urged this team to pressure to get rid of Prigozhin, and may have set a trap for him. The latter realized this well, and sought to be a step ahead of them<sup>(12)</sup>.

(9) Wagner chief accuses General Staff of not sending enough munitions to his troops, Military statement, May 5, 2023, link

(10) Автор: Денис Волков - Не ВедНО КОН А: ПОа РоССиеН Не Т СКОРОНО БАВАРАНА КОНФЕКТА НА ККРА - Бевада -Бентр-[Online] - 05.06.2023, link  
Report: Denis Volkov, Why Russians Aren't Waiting for an Near End to the Conflict in Ukraine, Levada Center, June 5, 2023.

(11) Бсточник: Meduza - Как работала медиаимперия Пригофина? - Meduza - [Online] - 6 years 2023, Link  
How did Prigozhin's media empire work? Russian Medusa Investigative Network, June 6, 2023.

(12) Автор: Бкатерина Базарева - Блиты начали борьбу за деньги на новые города Бойгу и Трутнева - URA- [Online] -06 сентября 2021, Link  
- Смотрите такфе: Как "победил" клан, [Online] - 10 сентября 2013, link  
Report: Ekaterina Lazareva, Elite Struggle for Money between Shoigu and Trutnev, Russian news network (URA)6, September 2021.





## Second: Implications of the Wagner Rebellion on Putin's Internal Authority

The power system in Russia has been entrenched since Ivan the Terrible, himself proclaimed tsar in 1547. It includes the "Boyar" (nobility) class, the army, the security forces, and the Orthodox Church<sup>(13)</sup>. The people have been and are still outside this equation, which may change from time to time in some parts of it. For example, the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party replaced the Church until the latter returned to play its role since 1991, albeit less so than in the past.

The role of the ruler in Russia is to manage these contradictions and conflicts, which he often serves to nurture to ensure his authority. The more he is acceptable and able to resolve and/or suppress these conflicts, the more he enjoys legitimacy, acceptance, and the ability to govern; especially in light of the Russian saying: "The Sultan is either in the palace or in the grave"<sup>(14)</sup>.

Regardless of all the hypotheses that have been talked about since the beginning of this rebellion, its occurrence in itself and in such a way is evidence of Putin's weakening authority, and his declining ability to manage contradictions and conflicts among the ruling elite<sup>(15)</sup>. Moreover, the balance he had sought to maintain over the past years was greatly shaken after Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu and the elites gathered around him, both inside and outside the military, were able to stamp out Wagner's independence and Prigozhin's annoying statements.

(13) Автор: Буряков Сергей Константинович Билимонов Александр Бригорьевич - ПРОРОРОРОРАСКООСАТВА е ПРyКРКРРАТеСКа Дунуки »CyberLinka, [link]

Authors: Boriakov Sergei Konstantinovich and Philemonov Alexander Grigorievich, The Nature of the Russian State and the Process of Democratic Transitions, Academic Research Paper in Political Science - Library (CyberLeninka) Russian Academy.

(14) Автор: Вачась - «Война кланов за трон Путина началась». Бнтервь с российским Бурналистом-расследователем - антервь с РОМАН АНеН-Радио Азаттык - [Online] - 25 мая 2023, Link  
Report: Vaga Tavbredze , Clan War on Putin's Throne, Interview with Russian Scholar Roman Anin, Radio Azatik , May 25, 2023.

(15) АНАеТеКА: - RE-RUSSIA - 17 Apr 2023, Link  
Analysis: Result of the Gerasimov-Prigogin conflict over the present and future of the war in Ukraine , (RE-RUSSIA) Platform for Studies "Russia" , April 17, 2023.



On the one hand, the weakness of the military establishment and Shoigu were exposed before the people and subjected to public insults<sup>(16)</sup>. On the other hand, however, Shoigu strengthened his positions in the army and within the elite ranks, while Putin became largely forced to keep pace with the regular security and military forces, whose loyalty is not guaranteed, especially after he appeared to have a loose grip on a deterrent force that owed him loyalty, and supposedly a tool in his hand in the face of any possible consensus to choose someone else to replace him<sup>(17)</sup>.

(16) By: Paul Goble-Wagner PMC Exemplifies How Putin Has Destroyed Russian State, Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 20 Issue: 109 - Jamestown Foundation - [Online] - July 7,2023, link  
Analysis: Paul Goble, How Putin Destroyed the Russian State, Publication: (Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 20 Issue), Jamestown Foundation, July 7, 2023.

(17) Автор: Бориса Кагарлифкого - Кагарлифкий letters - Телеграмма - 3 и Бля 2023, link  
Analysis: Russian political sociologist (Boris Kagarlitsky), personal channel (Telegram), July 3, 2023.





## Third: Implications of the Wagner Rebellion on Russia's External Influence

In the medium term, at least, Wagner's actions in Africa and its presence in other places are not expected to be affected. The group has achieved an expansion in the countries of the African Sahel, which Russian policy has not been able to achieve throughout Putin's rule. The geopolitical capital that Russia has won cannot be easily squandered, which may be - to a large extent - one of the main motives for Putin not to level a direct accusation to Prigozhin.

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said Moscow "will not leave its African partners." Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova confirmed this by saying that "the question of whether Wagner will continue to operate in Africa must be decided by the governments of the countries where PMCs are located", while Fidel Guancia, an adviser to the Central African President, announced in an interview with the Financial Times that they would deal with "any party that Moscow sends to them, whether Wagner stays, or it sends Beethoven or Mozart".

In Syria, the situation may be different from the rest of the areas where Wagner is located, as the Russian army is directly present, though the military operations have been almost halted for years, so the Russian army, after the Wagner rebellion, closed its bases in Syria and its leaders got arrested there<sup>(18)</sup>.

Wagner fighters abroad are the most professional, and have become experienced in dealing with security challenges, interacting with local actors in the countries in which they operate. Neither the military, nor any other Russian private military company has these characteristics. And they have been largely away from the recent insurgency. Perhaps Wagner's presence will be strengthened as it withdraws from the conflict in Ukraine, and its energies will be further directed to the external activities for which it was founded<sup>(19)</sup>.

(18) Авторы: Марианна Беленькая - А-а, в Африке «Вагнер» вот такой ширины - Коммерсант- [Online]-30.06.2023, Link

Report: Marianna Belenkaya: The future of Wagner in Africa - Kommersant, Russia, June 30, 2023.

(19) Wagner's future in Africa in question after Russian mutiny, Financial Times, June 28, 2023: link



## Conclusion

Wagner and other private companies were established as a military arm to serve Russia's geopolitical goals, and fight proxy wars, similar to what the Soviet policy was doing. This time, however, it is done without internationalist slogans, or slogans of “national liberation.”

The establishment of these private military entities began to be contemplated in 2010 through the expertise of Eben Barlow, one of the leaders of guerrilla warfare, and by the recruitment of mercenaries under the abhorrent apartheid regime in South Africa. The "Slavonic Legion" was the first experiment, bearing a name of a nationalist nature.

It was managed by former Russian army officer Dmitry Utkin, who later became one of the founders of Wagner.

Looking at the founding leaders of Wagner and other military companies, the common denominator among them is their bad reputation and previous criminal record, which indicates the Kremlin's preference for the Kambramat method (Компромат), which is one of the methods used by the KGB in selecting stigmatized leaders after blackmailing them with incriminating evidence, and bargaining to ensure their loyalty and not turning against the establishment.

Putin has ensured that he remains in power according to the rules of the Russian game; through his ability to manage contradictions between different clans, and through their acceptance of him as an "arbiter" in their disputes over power and wealth, and by promoting of senior leaders in the army who do not have experience, acceptance, respect or popularity. All that was to ensure that they cannot control him. Moreover, he formed corresponding military structures, such as the Federal Guard Service (FSO), which was formed in 1996 to protect Yeltsin from any coup attempt after his failure in the First Chechen War (1994-1996), and the discontent of the military and nationalists towards him.





Putin added another device, the Russian National Guard, which he founded in 2016, along with the distribution of power between the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB), the Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR), and the armed forces of the Russian Federation.

Putin granted Ramzan Kadyrov broad political powers in Chechnya, real federal rule, support for the establishment of a military force (Kadyrovtsy), and annexation of that as part of the Russian National Guard. His last step in this regard was inflating the Wagner forces, which is made up of criminals and former military men who despise the current army leadership.

All of the above led to the conflict of the old security and military services and their competition with each other, and the introduction of a strange element represented by the Chechen forces, to revive the Russian memory of what the Russians met with the resistance of the Chechens in the insurgency period in the 1990s, and to emphasize that Putin alone is the guarantee of peace in Chechnya, and its status as part of the Russian Federation. Through this approach of spreading fear and anxiety of all, and among all, Putin included - or so he thought - that he became the “master of the game”, and that any attempt to upset this balance will lead to the end of everyone. If the army thinks about supporting any coup attempt of the elite, the FSB will oppose it; and if the latter is in solidarity with the army, the Federal Guard Service will oppose them; and if the three of them are in solidarity with each other, the National Guard will oppose them. Even within this National Guard, there are Chechen forces; and if it decides that this force will exploit its position of independence, everyone will turn against it; and if the National Guard thinks about the coup, the Chechen forces will oppose it for fear of losing the autonomy of Chechnya. Wagner forces, however, are able to be a likely element if the situation worsens or if the cards are mixed. As such, everyone will realize that Putin's survival is in the interest of all.



Prigozhin maintained the required balance at the outbreak of military action in Ukraine. Shoigu, who has had control over the state's economic and military resources got Prigozhin repeatedly criticizing and insulting him, which demeaned him and hurt his already weak popularity.

All the above explains Putin's acceptance of the mediation of the President of Belarus Lukashenko to end the Wagner rebellion and pardon its leadership, if we accept the hypothesis of the existence of a rebellion outside his control, despite the harm this may cause to his image. He might have thought that this problem can be addressed later; because the alternative is the intervention of the army to end the rebellion. And if this scenario occurs, Putin is well aware that his leadership will not end the confrontation except by completely eliminating Wagner, in an attempt by the army to polish its image again and appear as the protector of legitimacy and suppressor of the rebellion against it, thus erasing all the criticism it has suffered as a result of the modest performance in Ukraine, and thus will end up merging all private companies and official military structures within the army. This hypothesis also explains Putin's request to move the forces of Ramzan Kadyrov which is part of the National Guard. It also explains his granting the latter the right to possess heavy weapons that the army would not accept under normal circumstances.

During and after the rebellion, two main hypotheses prevailed and still do:

**The first hypothesis:** This "rebellion" is planned; it may have gotten out of control in some of its phases. In general; however, it has brought Putin several benefits:

- Create justification for establishing Wagner bases in Belarus to threaten NATO's eastern flank and distribute its military resources to Poland and the Baltic states instead of focusing them on Ukraine.
- Put Ukraine under pressure to launch an attack from Belarus towards Kiev (the distance between Minsk and Kiev is only 500 kilometres); thus dispersing its power to mitigate the counterattack.



- Creating a state of terror in the West about the possibility of the presence of forces beyond control acquiring nuclear weapons.
- Pressuring the West to negotiate without waiting for Putin to leave; as some Western powers hope.
- Testing elite loyalties after a major breakdown of trust between them and Putin since the start of the war in Ukraine.
- Test the loyalty of the security services (Putin seems to have made sure that the National Guard's loyalty is firm to him).
- Ruining the plan of some elites to choose Shoigu, or another figure, as a substitute for Putin.
- Prepare the campaign slogan for the 2024 presidential election: "Putin, or chaos and civil war."

**The second hypothesis:** What happened is a "rebellion" beyond control:

- Putin sacrificed a large part of his prestige so as not to break the balance he has kept through the growing role of the army and its leadership.
- Putin maintained Wagner's structure until he saw how he would deal with it. He was keen on stressing its patriotism, and made no accusation against Prigozhin. Parallel to that, he fixed this imbalance by giving more power to the National Guard, whose loyalty to him was strongly reconfirmed.
- Official propaganda can portray Putin's apparent weakness as "wisdom" to avoid bloodshed between brothers.

Neither hypothesis seems accurate, as things in today's world are not sharply binary or (black-and-white). It is said that "Everything is relative." Putin is not a superman (as official Russian propaganda tries to portray him); and the Russian situation is much more complicated than these oversimplified perceptions. Moreover, Prigozhin is not either a fool, nor can he be; as he has gotten to where he is. He is a prison godfather, with a non-Slavic background, in a political society dominated by Russian chauvinism.





Most likely, due to - age factors - increasing isolation with the length of his rule (23 years in power) - plans faltering in Ukraine - unexpected and unprecedented Western reaction - military, political and economic support for Ukraine - lack of new plans in his pocket, and - American decision-making circles deep understanding of his personality after all these years; all have weakened Putin's grip on power, and a decline in his image in the eyes of the conflicting Russian clans of the oligarchy. Moreover, the composition of Putin's character does not accept any person (whatever his loyalty to him is, and even if his diligence is in his favour) to take any action without returning to him first for consent and with full adherence to what Putin set in advance for this person.

What happened was a natural conflict spawned by the changes created by the war, and the ensuing developments and conflict between old elites who want to preserve their gains on the one hand and new elites whose role has increased due to the war, and who want a special place for themselves.

Prigozhin is a perfect person for Putin. His ethnic background and criminal record do not qualify him to aspire to the centre of power, as he is a non-military person with military power. His role will always be limited, if the situation develops into a power struggle.

Prigozhin also has the management and business experience. He has the dynamism required to get the job done for the Russian bureaucracy; especially jobs it can't do. He got the charisma required to control his forces, push them into battle on the battlefield, and protect the president's power.



Prigozhin also designed Wagner and its financial institutions in Putin's footsteps (in a way that no one else can easily manage without losing control over it). This is precisely what has constituted the real safety element in Prigozhin. Getting rid of him - at least for now - means that Putin is breaking a promise. This will be portrayed as the closest thing to a "vendetta"; which is not what a head of state, wanting to be a super power, would do. Most importantly, it would mean the loss of human and economic capital in Africa, which is difficult to compensate for. Moreover; it would be turning Prigozhin into an "icon" for a significant segment of the population.



It is widely believed Prigozhin will be there, until Putin ensures there is a replacement for him. He may be sent to Africa to continue his work there after being domesticated and brought under greater control than before. Putin is expected to make several tours and internal visits, the aim of which is to emphasize popularly the extent of his self-confidence, the people's support for him, and most importantly to send a message abroad that he is still the strong leader in control, and that waiting for the alternative to make a better deal is not the right choice.

Despite all this, the events of history have taught us that Russia is unpredictable for a simple reason: the absence of rules. In light of this, all possibilities - even ones that seem fictional - can become a reality. Therefore Russia's future is shrouded in ambiguity. It is a situation that cannot qualify it to become a great power or ensure that it maintains its external influence except for a limited period of time.



# Dimensions

for Strategic Studies

-  \DimensionsCTR
-  \DimensionsCTR
-  \dimensionscenter
-  \dimensionscenter

---

[info@dimensionscenter.net](mailto:info@dimensionscenter.net)



# أبعاد للدراسات الإستراتيجية



تونس.. عاان على  
الإجراءات الاستثنائية،  
هل تعود تونس إلى ما  
قبل عام 2011؟

احتمالية عودة تونس إلى حقب ما  
قبل العام 2011 بعد الإجراءات  
الاستثنائية التي بدأها الرئيس  
التونسي قيس سعيد في 25 تموز  
2021.

المزيد





## أهم الإصدارات



إصدارات المركز إدارة التحرير



إصدارات المركز إدارة التحرير



إصدارات المركز أحمد دهشان



إصدارات المركز محمد رقيب أوغلو



زيارة مركز أبعاد للدراسات لوزارة الداخلية التركية

إدارة التحرير  إصدارات المركز 



DimensionsCTR @dimensionscenter

أبعاد الموقف

تموز / يوليو 2023

تصاعد التوتر بين الفرقاء الليبيين يهدد بعرقلة العملية الانتقالية

إدارة التحرير  إصدارات المركز 

تقدير موقف

## تمرد فاغنر أسبابه وانعكاساته الداخلية والخارجية

### تمرد فاغنر أسبابه وانعكاساته الداخلية والخارجية

فرضيتان أساسيتان تفسران حادثة تمرد زعيم فاغنر على المؤسسة العسكرية الروسية الرسمية، ومحاويلته اجتياح العاصمة موسكو عسكرياً

□ أحمد دهشان

عام على الغزو الروسي لأوكرانيا..  
التداعيات الاقتصادية والسياسية العالمية

مع مرور عام على الحرب الروسية ضد أوكرانيا،  
ما هي أبرز التداعيات الاقتصادية والسياسية لهذه  
الحرب...



□ جهاد الملاح

الأزمة السياسية في لبنان.. ملفات متشابهة  
في انتظار حلول الخارج

يعيش لبنان أزمة سياسية حادة تتداخل فيها ملفات  
عدة منذ 2019، إلا أن اختيار الرئيس أو...



□ ربيع دندشلي



الاتفاق الإطارى فى السودان: الأبعاد  
والمسارات المستقبلية

إن السيناريوهات المستقبلية للأوضاع فى السودان  
بعد توقيع الاتفاق الإطارى تظل مرتبطة بنوايا  
المجلس العسكرى وقدرته...



عمر سمير

الفشل الأسمى فى التعاطى مع كارثة  
الزلازل فى شمال غرب سورية

تُركت مناطق شمال غرب سورية دون أى  
مساعدهات دولية بعد الزلازل، وخذلت الأمم المتحدة  
السوريين باعترافها،...



عبادة أحمد العبد الله

دراسات

خارطة الطريق الإسرائيلية فى القرن الإفريقى

مستقبل تنظيم داعش بين احتمالات الانحسار والتمدد



إعداد عدنان أبو عامر



إعداد د. عرابى عبد الحى عرابى

الاتحاد الأوروبى بعد غزو أوكرانيا: تحولات ومسارات

صعود الاحزاب اليمينية المتطرفة فى اوربا: الأبعاد والتداعيات





إعداد جهاد الملاح □



إعداد د. محمد عصام لعروسي □



## أبعاد للدراسات الإستراتيجية

مركز أبعاد للدراسات الإستراتيجية، مركز دراسات وتفكير، تأسس في لندن مطلع يناير 2020، بفريق من الباحثين والخبراء المختصين من مجموعة واسعة من دول منطقة الشرق الأوسط.

### الأقسام

إصدارات المركز

تقدير الموقف

دراسات

مقالات

ترجمات

### آخر الإصدارات

٢٠٢٣/٠٧/٢٨

المصالح المشتركة تدفع الأعداء في الشرق الأوسط للصدافة في الوقت  
الراهن

٢٠٢٣/٠٧/٢٥

تونس.. امان على الإجراءات الاستثنائية، هل تعود تونس إلى ما قبل عام  
٢011؟

## اتصل بنا

+442036758971



info@dimensionscenter.net



Dimensions, The Mille, 1st floor, 1000 Great West Road, Brentford, TW8 9DW, GB



padtech طور بواسطة Dimensions Center 2023©