



Dimensions
for Strategic Studies

Analytical Report



Tracks of the Russian War on Ukraine

Prepared by: Prof. Khalil Azima

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Dimensions for Strategic Studies

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Preamble

In recent years, the Russian-Ukrainian conflict has acquired a deep and long-lasting character, leading to radical changes in relations between Moscow and Kiev. The Russian aggression has caused unprecedented human, regional and economic losses to Ukraine and has had a heavy impact on relations between the two States.

The Russo-Ukrainian War is not a marginal domestic conflict. The Kremlin's aggression threatens not only the State and sovereignty of Ukraine, but also the unity of the European Union and the political system of Europe in general. Russia used almost an entire arsenal, from direct armed aggression to the Economy, Energy, and Information Group, and the means to destabilize the country from within, some of which were sabotaging information, espionage, exporting corruption, and defaming state structures.

Russia began an open military offensive, launched with the support of Belarus, against Ukraine, at 3:40 a.m.

on February 24, 2022, in continuation of the Russian-Ukrainian war waged by Moscow in 2014.

Russian President Vladimir Putin has announced the start of a "special military operation" with the alleged aim of "removing Nazism and disarming Ukraine." Within a few minutes, rocket strikes began throughout the territory of Ukraine, including areas near Kiev. The United Nations General Assembly, in its resolution of 2 March 2022, condemned the Russian invasion of Ukraine as an aggression by Russia against Ukraine and, on 16 March 2022, the United Nations International Court of Justice in The Hague strongly urged Russia to the cessation of military operations in Ukraine.

Thanks to the resistance of the Ukrainian army and the Self-Defense Forces, in the early days of the aggression, the Russian army suffered significant losses in manpower and equipment.



According to estimates by Ukrainian and international experts, in its recent history, Russia has not suffered such great losses in such a short time in any war. According to Western intelligence, Russia faced stronger resistance than expected, leading to logistical and technical problems plaguing its forces, in addition to shortages of fuel, ammunition and food, and undermining the moral of the attackers.

Rapid unification of the world's states to help Ukraine, as well as strong sanctions against Moscow, became an unexpected blow to Russia.

From the first day of the invasion, Russia violated the rules of war and committed mass war crimes, while the Russian authorities wage a vigorous media war.



Historical review

Ukraine was the cornerstone of the Soviet Union until the vast majority of the population voted for independence in a democratic referendum on 1 December 1991.

After removing political pressure from the Soviet Union, the majority of Eastern European countries recognized their peoples' aspirations for European integration and joined NATO (in 2004, the Baltic states joined Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, and four years later in 2008, Ukraine announced its intention to seek future NATO membership by gradually approaching its political and military parameters).

In his 1997 book, which had an impact on the Russian army, police, and foreign-policy elite, Oleksandr Dugin wrote that Ukraine must be annexed to Russia because “it has no geopolitical significance, special cultural importance, global importance, or geographic or ethnic exclusivity.”

He added: "Ukraine as an independent state with certain regional ambitions, represents a tremendous danger to all of Eurasia, and without solving the Ukrainian problem, it is generally absurd to talk about continental politics.



"Dugin's book had a tremendous impact on Putin's foreign policy.

In addition, to justify the invasion, Russian propaganda uses the Emirate of Kiev Ross and its baptism. It is presented through propaganda as the alleged spiritual cradle of the Russian nation and culture. Ross' baptism is interpreted as the source of spirituality, culture, and patriotism (the Emirate of Kiev Ross, the basis of Ukraine's national history and heritage). The existence of an independent Ukraine, as well as of an independent Ukrainian Orthodox Church, is intolerable for Russia.

At the beginning of 2014, mass protests in Kiev, known as the European Square (the Maidan Revolution), ended with the removal of Ukraine's pro-Russian president, Viktor Yanukovich, who long declared his intention to sign a partnership agreement with the EU, but abandoned these intentions under Moscow's influence. In order to justify Ukraine's invasion and change of government into a pro-Russian government, Russia launched a large-scale anti-Ukrainian propaganda campaign, the main theses of which were Nazi domination, the Western-backed genocide of Russians, whom Moscow must save, and the protection of the Russian language.

By playing on Ukraine's political instability, Russia annexed the Ukrainian Crimea, staged a secession insurgency in eastern Ukraine, and dispatched its agents, troops, and weapons to Donbas. Russia imposed the controversial Minsk Agreements on Ukraine under the threat of an escalation of hostilities and accused Kiev of continuing to violate them.

As a result of the conflict in Donbas, nearly 14,000 people were killed, and 1.5 million Ukrainians became internally displaced.

Tension between Ukraine and Russia has increased due to the establishment of the "Nord Stream 2" gas pipeline in the Baltic Sea, the launch of which will stop or limit the transport of Russian gas through Ukraine to the west via Ukrainian gas pipelines in the Baltic Sea.

In December 2021, Russia made a number of allegations against Western countries, accusing them of working to "expand NATO" and demanding that the West withdraw its forces and weapons from the former "Eastern Bloc" countries,



claiming the restoration of military and political power to the influence of the former Soviet Union.

Specifically, it demanded assurances from Ukraine not to join NATO, as well as to refuse to supply Western weapons, and threatened an unspecified military response if these demands were not fully met.

NATO rejected these absurd demands, and the US warned Russia of “quick and severe” economic sanctions in the event of a continued invasion of Ukraine.

During February, Canada, Estonia, and Lithuania provided weapons to Ukraine, including anti-aircraft missile systems and anti-tank missile systems.

On 21 February 2022, Russia officially recognized the so-called "People's Republic of Donetsk" and the "People 's Republic of Luhansk" as independent States and publicly sent additional troops to Donbas.

On 22 February, Putin announced that the Minsk Agreements were no longer in force.

On the same day, the Council of the Russian Federation unanimously approved the use of military force in these territories. On 24 February 2022, Russia launched an open military offensive, with the support of Belarus, against Ukraine.



Tracks of war

When Russian troops began advancing to the Ukrainian border on 24 February, Moscow expected to seize Kiev in three days' time.

Many external observers feared the destruction of Ukrainian forces.

Moscow's plan was repressive measures to stabilize control of Ukraine by Victory Day on 9 May.

However, the Russian offensive has been repulsed with heavy casualties and is now turning into a limited offensive to try to seize the Donetsk and Luhansk regions.

The objectives of the war demanded by Russian officials have changed over time, due to the changing situation on the front.

Within two weeks of the invasion, references to 'disarmament' and 'Nazi disarmament' became less common in official statements.

The goals of the special operation were announced to be to protect Russia from the military threat posed by Western countries and Ukraine, the end of the war in Donbas and the protection of the population of the so-called "People's Republic of Donetsk" and the "People's Republic of Luhansk".

According to the February results, Putin's Russia made a strategic mistake.

Anticipating a blitzkrieg and forcing Ukraine to quickly change government to one that favors Moscow, Russian troops were already exhausted on the third day of the war, owing to the fierce resistance of the Ukrainian armed forces.

The position of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelinsky, who refused to leave Kiev, was unexpected for both Russia and the West.

The militant spirit of the defenders and the national identity of the Ukrainians only strengthened against the backdrop of the occupiers' failures.

Kiev has received support from the European Union; and NATO has begun the process of imposing severe sanctions on Russia.

At the end of March, the Russians focused their attacks on fuel depots to make it difficult for Ukrainians to provide logistics and create a humanitarian crisis.



Unable to advance on the ground, Russian forces have increased the number of air attacks on residential areas and infrastructure.

Due to significant losses, Russia has begun to raft military personnel from support units, especially from educational institutions, as attempts to recruit volunteers have proven ineffective.

In the last days of March, Russian troops withdrew from Kiev, and the focus remained on the eastern direction.

On 31 March, the armed forces of Ukraine liberated Busha, and the occupiers left Chernobyl.

On 25 March, the Russian side stated that the main objective of the Russian forces was only to establish full control over Donbas' territory.

On 11 April, Lavrov spoke about the new goal, saying that "the special military operation aims to put an end to the expansion of the United States towards full hegemony, along with the rest of the Western countries under its control, in the international arena.

"On 22 April, after information emerged about the imminent large-scale Russian offensive in the south-east, the deputy commander of the central military region, Rustam Minkayev, stated that the aim of the "second phase of the special operation" was "to establish full control over Donbas and southern Ukraine", to ensure a land corridor to Crimea and "another exit to Transnistria, where the persecution of the Russian-speaking population is also noticed."

At the end of May, Russian forces launched an attack on the Lemnan, Bubasnaya, Siviroduonetsk and Slovyansk regions.

By 28 May, the Ukrainian armed forces had pushed Russian forces into the Siviroduonetsk, Tushkevka and Oskolonivka regions to the former positions.

Later, the Russians advanced deeply in Severodonetsk and Ukrainian forces were able to cross Ingolts and construct a bridgehead on the other bank of the river. On 31 May, the European Union approved a ban on Russian oil, which will reduce its imports by the end of 2022 by 90%.

In June, the Ukrainian armed forces liberated more than 20 settlements in the Kherson region.



Ukraine and other States repeatedly accused Germany of delaying the delivery of weapons, while German Chancellor Olav Schultz, after visiting Ukraine with French President Emmanuel Macron on 17 June, said that German heavy weapons would arrive in time to turn the tide of the war in Donbas.

According to British intelligence, Ukraine's coastal defenses have significantly diminished Russia's ability to extend control over the Black Sea.

The strikes by Ukrainian forces on the Russian boat Vasily on 17 June, which was transporting weapons, as well as the strikes of 20 June against oil and gas exploration platforms, which were seized in 2014, as well as the missile attack on the occupied island of Zmini, which was later taken over, contributed to this.

On 23 June, the European Council granted Ukraine the status of candidate for EU membership, while Kyiv planned to implement the European Commission's recommendations on starting accession negotiations by the end of 2022.

On the night of 24 June, the Ukrainian armed forces withdrew from Severodunsk to more fortified positions.

Battles in the city have overwhelmed Russian forces and forced them to weaken offensives in other areas of the front.

At the summit in Madrid on 29 June, NATO considered Russia to be the biggest threat.

Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg has stated that NATO faces its greatest challenge since the Second World War.

Simultaneously, Putin said: The ultimate goals of Ukraine's "special operation" are the liberation of Donbas and obtaining security guarantees for Russia.

On 4 July, the Ukrainian flag was hoisted on the island of Zmini, marking the full return of the island to Ukrainian control.

In the rest of southern Ukraine, the Ukrainian armed forces are advancing "slowly but steadily," said Natalya Homenyuk, spokeswoman for the Southern Operations Command Press Center.



War and the Military

The Ukrainians showed high flexibility in resisting Russian aggression, as well as the emergence of the leadership qualities of the country's President, Volodymyr Zelinsky, "who was able to unite the people and the armed forces in the struggle."

The Russian army's failures in the first weeks of the invasion can be explained by two main factors: first, a completely wrong political assessment of the situation; and second, the way it developed hostilities, which clearly showed that the Kremlin believed it would be possible to enter Ukraine without resistance, and the Russian army would be received with flowers (as the former chairman of the State Duma's Defense Committee, General Vladimir Shamanov, said).

This is confirmed by the military offensive across the swamp terrain at a time when the ice is expected to melt.

Russia also appears to have fallen victim to its own propaganda, which claimed that the country's armed forces were in excellent condition.

This may be true in certain areas, such as air defense or aviation in general, but this in no way applies to ground forces that are in a neglected state, a situation aggravated by serious errors in the command structure, which was very complex, but this has now changed, as changes have been made in the command positions of the forces.

Russia was not well prepared logistically, nor did it have priority areas for launching attacks.

However, all these mistakes were taken into account in the so-called "second phase of the special military operation": there are fewer logistical problems, although they still exist, and there is an operational concentration of troops in small areas, where the Russian army is trying to advance and put pressure on the Ukrainian army.

The battles near Severodonetsk and Leshansk are examples of the Russian armed forces' use of new tactics. After the fall of Severodonetsk, the entire Luhansk region fell into the hands of pro-Russian separatists.



After that, the focus was on the Donetsk region - the cities of Slavyansk and Karakomarovsk.

In this case, the next operational objective may be full military control of the entire territory of Donbas.

The Russian military is still able to move forward taking advantage of enormous firepower, but this will happen slowly, through small tactical steps.

In addition, it will be difficult for Russia to attract more active reserves to the war without an overall mobilization.

In Ukraine, Russia has widely used cruise missiles and ballistic missiles to strike targets of high military, political and economic significance.

Given the low effectiveness of the Russian air force, those weapons are vital for long-term military operations.

The exact features of these weapons are unknown, but as the war progressed, Ukrainian officials noted a decline in the quality of the weapons systems used to perform a number of tasks, for example, returning to Soviet system on the main front.

U.S. estimates suggest that Russian forces appear to lack precision weapons. When it comes to prestigious weapons systems, such as the short-range ballistic missile Alexander-M, there is a limited stockpile that Russia can use against Ukraine without undermining its defense plans against NATO, China and others. Without a guaranteed supply of production, Russians must stockpile a large part of their reserves, which will limit their ability to strike Ukraine in the coming months.

Here, however, Russia's military industry faces a problem, because modern Russian weapons rely heavily on specialized, vital components manufactured abroad. Therefore, for military considerations, Putin was forced to reduce the conflict as part of a new strategy and change tactics and military objectives, and this is a "strategic defeat."

Moscow's original goal during the war in Ukraine was always what it wanted to achieve, namely, to prevent further expansion of the "Atlantic Alliance" and, in particular, to prevent Ukraine's membership in NATO.

This goal has completely failed, as Finland and Sweden have now submitted applications to join NATO.

The Ukrainian side has already suffered considerable losses, both human and material.

Now he has to defend himself from the Russian firepower, and that's where Western arms supply comes in.

Therefore, it seems that this war is turning into a resource war, the end of which is not on the horizon, because each side believes that it will be able to win the battle by military means, while it has become difficult for the Ukrainian side, to agree to a compromise after the terrible events that took place in North Kiev.

The supply of Western weapons to Kiev will affect the additional course of warfare; and this can be seen in unmanned aerial vehicles used for reconnaissance, and in artillery systems that can respond quickly and directly.

The supply of M270 MLRS missile systems from the UK and HIMARS MLRS from the US will help Ukraine ensure a more favorable position in future negotiations, but they are unlikely to be able to change the general course of the war.

Ukraine must bear in mind the possibility that the course of war will not change in its favor.

The Ukrainian army has so far fought better than anyone could have expected, but one cannot be sure that it will continue to do so.

Russia has now concentrated its troops and equipment on a smaller part of the country, and, thanks to this, its success has improved.

The scenario that Ukraine would roll back the Russian army across the state border now seems less likely, as Putin resorts to the use of weapons of mass destruction.

War and politics

As the Russian war against Ukraine continues, more and more calls for an end to this conflict have emerged in the United States and Europe.

Italy presented a detailed peace plan, while French President Emmanuel Macron stressed the importance of giving Russia an opportunity to leave while saving face.

Former US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger has offered Ukraine the surrender of territory to Russia in exchange for peace.

But wars end only in one of two ways: when one side imposes its will on the other, first on the battlefield and then at the negotiating table; or when the two sides agree on a compromise that they consider preferable to the continuation of bloodshed.

In Ukraine, however, neither of the above scenarios is likely to materialize in the near future, and the conflict has turned into a war of attrition, with the Russian and Ukrainian armies facing each other in a rather limited space.

In the diplomatic sphere, Kiev is not interested in reconciling with Russia and ceding a large part of Ukrainian territory.

In turn, Putin is not interested in agreeing to anything that might appear to the public inside Russia as a “defeat.”

Therefore, the inescapable conclusion is that the war will continue for a long time.

Since there will be no victory or compromise, the United States and Europe need a strategy to manage the conflict with an uncertain outcome.

The West is "managing" the crisis, not "resolving" it, because the solution requires radical changes in Moscow's behavior, starting with either a mass protest in Russia due to economic collapse or collective losses, or under pressure from China.

But all of this is unlikely, and everyone will have to wait until a new leader appears in Russia, ready to reconcile with a truly sovereign Ukraine.

What the West can do is maintain its support for Ukraine and strengthen its military capabilities, avoid direct military intervention and increase economic pressure on Russia, which requires policies designed to make the war manageable rather than end it.

Failing to change the regime in Kyiv, Putin curtailed his ambitions and focused on retaining control of parts of southern and eastern Ukraine in order to connect the areas he had occupied in 2014.

However, he certainly did not abandon his conviction that Ukraine had no right to be a sovereign State.

As a result, it is hard to imagine Putin agreeing to end the war.

The slightest possibility of any changes affecting Putin's calculations is, for example, criticism of the war within Russia, especially since Ukraine claims that more than 30,000 soldiers have already died on its territory.

In a normal society, this would undermine support for the war, but, given that the Russian government effectively controls information and suppresses its adversaries, there has been virtually no internal criticism of the war in Russia so far.

There is a presumption that China will put pressure on the Kremlin, but it still stands by Russia.

If the West can convince Beijing to distance itself from Moscow, Putin may realize that he lost an important partner during the invasion.

The United States and Europe should do everything in their power to keep China and Russia as far apart as possible, and could offer some initiatives to Beijing, warning that continued support for Russia would lead to a deterioration of U.S.-Chinese relations. But it is unlikely that the US and Europe will be able to convince Xi to do anything at least that will help defeat Russia.

Kiev's calculations seem more complicated. Like all the countries that were attacked, Ukraine was forced to set its targets quickly.

Its government does not speak with one voice, and President Volodymyr Zelinski has changed his position several times.

At first, he said that he would agree to nothing more than restoring the status quo that had existed since 1991, when Ukraine had become independent from the Soviet Union, and later, he implied that Kiev was ready to accept the status quo that existed after 2014, but before the invasion of 2022, which meant that Russia could maintain control over Crimea and part of Donbas.

In deciding on the issue of peace, Ukraine must take into account a number of factors, the most important of which is the direct cost of war. According to the UN, the country has lost more than 3,000 civilians.

According to Zelinski, up to 100 Ukrainian soldiers are killed in combat every day. The country's economy is expected to shrink by 45% by the end of the year. More than 6.5 million people had fled the country because of the war, while more than 7 million had become forced migrants within Ukraine, a very high and unaffordable price to pay.

One problem that Ukraine must contemplate is the uncertainty about continued Western support.

In the United States, cracks are emerging in bipartisan support for arming Ukraine. The classic signs of isolationism are beginning to appear in the Republican Party, while prominent Republicans, including Donald Trump and James Vance, insist that the internal problems of the United States are far more important than Ukraine's help.

In the democratic camp, the rise in fuel prices caused by the war is creating a serious political problem for the Biden administration.

Problems of abortion, gun control, inflation, border protection, and urban crimes are distracting Americans from the war.

In Europe, concerns about the long-term security and economic consequences of Russia's isolation are mounting, while Europeans are worried about a possible direct conflict between NATO and Moscow if Putin expands the war, the flow of Ukrainian refugees increases, and energy prices rise.

Not surprisingly, the desire to end the war has increased against the backdrop of increasing human, economic and diplomatic losses. The most commonly proposed solutions include that Ukraine cede part of the territory occupied by Russia in exchange for Moscow's agreement to stop the bloodshed.



Ukraine has acknowledged its willingness to abandon its ambitions to join NATO and is willing to become neutral, but only if it is well armed neutrality, which requires continued Western military support, and Russia is unlikely to agree to this.

Likewise, Moscow will not accept Ukraine joining the European Union, which is a priority for Zelinski.

It is also difficult to imagine Moscow and Kiev agreeing on external security guarantees for Ukraine or the presence of troops from third countries on Ukrainian territory, because all of this will strengthen the regional status that one of the parties will want to change in the future.

In contrast, the United States says that only Ukraine will decide what the peace agreement should be.

Such a position is difficult to justify, bearing in mind that for Washington, broader interests are at stake more than the Kiev case.

The Biden administration has put forward a wide range of different goals: from weakening Russia to regime change, knowing that at the end of May, Biden decided to clearly state his intentions by writing an article for the New York Times, in which he said: "We want to see a democratic, independent, sovereign and prosperous Ukraine with means to defend itself against future aggression."

The United States is interested in protecting the rule that States cannot change their borders by brutal force.

But these US interests run counter to the desire to avoid direct confrontation with armed Russia, as Washington refuses to send troops to Ukraine and rejects proposals to close Ukraine's airspace or break Russia's blockade of the country's ports.

This means that Ukraine will have to fight alone.

Even with Washington's help, it will not necessarily be able to restore the status quo that existed before 24 February, let alone fully regain territorial integrity.

Thus, the West needs a strategy for a long period of time, which would reflect that the current policy has been largely successful and that many of its features need to be expanded but some new elements need to be introduced as well.



To avoid direct military intervention, the US and Europe must continue to provide Ukraine with all the weapons it needs, as well as training and intelligence.

In this way, the Ukrainian army will be able to disrupt Russian military operations, as well as regain control of an increasingly large part of the territory.

This must support Ukraine's goal of fully restoring its territorial integrity through an open policy of sanctions and diplomatic efforts, the United States and Europe must not recognize any region that Putin calls "part of Russia", and Sweden and Finland must become full members of NATO, with special security assurances.

War and the economic aspect

Looking beyond the suffering and humanitarian crisis caused by the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the entire world economy will feel the effects of slower growth and faster inflation.

These effects will be manifested through three main channels: first, higher prices for primary commodities such as food and energy, and inflation will be pushed even higher, eroding the value of income and weakening demand; second, particularly neighboring economies: disruptions in trade, supply chains and workers' remittances abroad will increase and there will be a historic surge in refugee flows; and, third, declining business confidence and greater uncertainty for investors will weaken asset prices, tighten fiscal positions, and possibly stimulate capital inflows from emerging markets.

Prior to the Russian invasion, Western officials stressed the wide-ranging sanctions that would be imposed, desiring to deter Moscow by threatening punishment.

This failed for two reasons: **First**, Russia's tactical and operational assessments of Ukraine's balance of power, together with weak intelligence assessments of Ukraine's will to resist, gave the Russian government confidence that the war would be short, and thus the sanctions would create economic but not military problems.

Second, Russian officials were confident that the economic impact was manageable.



The latter assumption turned out to be more reliable than the former. Germany, for example, has been and will continue to be dependent on Russian gas for at least the next three years.

Given the existing infrastructure, there is no viable alternative supplier in the short term.

Diversification of supplies is possible, but it will be slow.

Reduced gas consumption during the summer will adversely affect German industry.

If Germany cuts gas consumption, it will enter a deep recession.

The danger is that the economic impact of oil prices will combine with higher heating costs in the fall, which will seriously test German and European decisions to preserve Ukraine.

As long as Russia continues to export gas to Europe, it has a reliable supply of large amounts of foreign currency.

Gas prices are usually linked to the price of oil.

Russia was also confident that the war would dramatically increase the price of oil.

This is compounded by considerable market uncertainty over Russian supply.

In addition, over the years, oil prices have often fallen below \$ 60 per barrel, creating significant financial problems in the Middle East and limiting investment returns for shale producers in the United States.

The current high price of oil enables them to balance their budgets, and energy prices will remain at a high level over the next year, covering a critical period of war. If the West tries to profit, it will reinforce the Russian narrative that the West is willing to inflict economic pain on non-members in order to advance its own interests.

Moscow is therefore confident that high oil prices and guaranteed gas exports will preserve its economy for the next few years while it enters isolation.

Russia also hopes to maintain the exports of nuclear reactors from Ross Atom to non-NATO countries, as a means of showing that maintaining economic relations with Russia also provides an opportunity to avoid the rise in energy prices according to Moscow's narrative due to Western hostility.



The development of nuclear power in countries such as Nigeria is likely to take longer than the current dynamics in the energy market will last, and the current circumstances could create a political context for a longer Russian presence.

However, the prospect of a protracted war poses a much broader set of challenges to Russia than the short war predicted.

Western media speak of Russian requests for Chinese military equipment and precision electronic components needed to continue producing technically advanced weapons.

We must assume that the West will have some difficulty in restricting Moscow's access to some sensitive components of Russian weapons.

Although Russian weapons are full of components made in the West, it is unclear whether manufacturers know that the Russian military is the end user.

Many of the components were dual-use techniques, and Moscow had established mechanisms for such goods through third countries.

Thus, restricting access may mean preventing exports to countries such as India, and in some cases even goods used for civilian purposes.

Unfortunately, this reinforces the Russian argument that the West is ready to inflict economic pain on the entire world in order to punish Moscow.

For this reason, fewer countries will comply with the sanctions.

Russia is also prepared to use blackmail to keep these channels open.

For example, many computer components for Russian cruise and ballistic missiles are purchased for civilian use by the Russian space program.

This explains why Dmitry Rogozin, head of the Russian space agency Roskosmos, warned that sanctions against his agency could cause satellites and even the International Space Station to leave orbit and cause damage outside Russia.

There are other economic repercussions, and a looming global famine is linked to the export of wheat.

The grain problem is not just about Ukrainian grain, it is a global problem.

It calls on the nations of the world to seek ways to pressure Russia to end the blockade and militarization of the Black Sea.



The world is thinking about how to force Moscow to comply with more than one UN resolution banning the militarization of the occupied Crimean Peninsula: Russia must leave the territory of Ukraine completely; Russia raises only the question of partial lifting of sanctions in exchange for lifting the ban on ports.

As Russia and Ukraine are major producers of primary commodities, disruptions in supply chains have led to a sharp rise in world prices, particularly for oil and natural gas.

Food costs jumped with the historic price of wheat, with Ukraine and Russia contributing 30% of global wheat exports.

Looking beyond global repercussions, the countries that will feel the most pressure are those with direct trade, tourism and financial exposures.

Economies dependent on oil imports will experience higher deficits in public finance and trade and greater inflationary pressures, although higher prices may benefit some oil-exporting countries such as those in the Middle East and Africa.

Rising food and fuel prices could lead to greater risks, such as instability in some regions, from Africa and Latin America to the Caucasus and Central Asia, while food insecurity is likely to increase in some parts of Africa and the Middle East.

In the longer term, the war could fundamentally alter the global economic and geopolitical system if energy trade is transformed, supply chains are re-established, payment networks fragmented, and countries rethink their holdings of reserve currencies.

Increasing geopolitical tensions threaten to increase the risks of economic fragmentation, particularly at the level of trade and technology.

Conclusion

In Russia, there is no way to pressure Ukraine politically. It must be understood that the war being waged by Moscow is defined as genocide against Ukrainian people according to a resolution of the Ukrainian Parliament in April this year. That is a correct and just interpretation of the current events.

At most, Russia's task is to destroy as many cities and their inhabitants as possible, suppress the resistance of the Ukrainian people and exercise maximum pressure on Ukraine's internal affairs, deprive the country of sovereignty and make its territory fully under Kremlin control (with its rulers), as well as prevent its integration into any bodies of Western society.

The war in Ukraine may come to an end early if Russia begins to experience internal contradictions.

However, the final word of the Ukrainian military on the battlefield is that they are already dictating conditions to politicians, and the terms of future ceasefire negotiations will depend on them.



The thing that could affect the war most is not only the division of the so-called ruling elites and the conflict among them, which would give Ukraine an opportunity to benefit from the fact that less attention from the Russians would be focused on it, but the movements that might be between the indigenous peoples of Russia (the Caucasus, Karelia, and the Far East), that is, the indigenous peoples who have the right to self-determination in accordance with the rules of international law, and did not achieve this because of the fact that they were once enslaved by the Russian Empire, and then subjected to repression by Soviet power.

Now these nationalities are being thrown into the war against Ukraine; and if they start mobilizing for the rights of self-government for the peoples and freedom from the ranks of the "empire," which they continue to suppress, then they will play a major role in changing the course of the war.



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info@dimensionscenter.net