



Dimensions
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study

Arabian Gas Project

Between economic ambitions
and politics and security obstacles

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Dimensions for Strategic Studies

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Introduction

The discoveries of Egyptian gas date back to the end of the sixties of the past century in the Abu Madi region in the Nile Delta.

"Belaim", the Egyptian-Italian company helped in the discovery.¹

Later, discoveries were made in the Mediterranean and Western Sahara in the early² 1970s.

Since then, it seemed that the Egyptian regions were pregnant with more reserves that would quickly come out to become a gas center in the region.

With the expansion of discoveries, and in 2000 in particular, the project of the Arab gas line aimed at transporting Egyptian gas to Europe via Jordan and Syria, through Turkey, emerged.

This line is expected to cover the needs of the region before the delivery of gas to Europe according to the increase of discovered quantities.

The project was implemented through three phases:

- **Phase 1:** This phase was from El-Arish in the Egyptian territory to Aqaba, Jordan, at a cost of US 220\$ million and a length of 250 km. The phase ended in 2003; and gas was actually pumped into Aqaba on that date. The theoretical capacity of the line was 10 billion cubic meters annually.
- **Phase II:** This was into two sub-phases; in Jordan towards the Rahab area near the Syrian border, with a length of 400 km and a cost of 300\$ million. It was completed in 2005 and pumped out in 2006. The power plants in northern Jordan benefited from this phase. The second sub-phase was in the Rahab area, with a length of 30 km.
- **Phase III:** It started in the Rahab region, crossed 30 km of the Syrian border; and it was completed in 2008.

(1) ESCWA, Petrobel, <https://archive.unescwa.org/balaeim-petroleum-company>

(2) Information on Egypt's First Invasive Discoveries, Day 7 ,2/6/2021: <https://bit.ly/3Aa4kT7>



Then, it crossed Syrian territory towards central Syria, where gas and oil pipeline connections were gathered in Homs at a length of 320 km.

It was actually completed in 2009, at a cost of more than 200\$ million.

It began pumping into Lebanon. In late 2011, pumping was halted.³

This line was scheduled to go towards the Turkish "Kalis" through the Syrian territory to connect to the "Annaco" pipeline towards Europe. As such the project would be completed. However, this phase was not finished for various reasons, most notably the Russian non approval, then the eruption of the Syrian revolution, and the disruption of most of the work. This shows that the Arab gas line project is located in the Arab territories at the very least, and it lacked a link to the Turkish "Nabco" pipeline for gas to be exported towards Europe.

⁽³⁾ Information on Arabian Gas Line, Day7, 9/9/2021: <https://bit.ly/3AftAaE>

Map No. 1:

Arab Gas Line and Projects it is expected to be connected to:





First: General outline of the Arab Gas Line Project

Talk about reviving the idea of the Arab gas line began in the aftermath of Lebanon's economic crisis that reached a rough road, and in which its economic march stalled.

Darkness dominated its installations and homes, and its political fog grew worse. Beirut became dimly lit, and the Lebanese villages drowning in a sea of darkness.

The situation continued like this until the Secretary-General of "Hezbollah" Hassan Nasrallah announced that Iran would assist Lebanon with fuel, and would periodically send fuel to the country drowning in⁴ darkness.

This announcement came days after talking about the possibility of assisting Lebanon through the Arab gas line with the approval of the United States of America, following the announcement of the US ambassador in Lebanon in this regard.⁵

There were discussions about a project to link Egypt, Jordan, and Iraq to a unified electrical network in the framework of what was known as the "New Levant Project".

Issues related to the reconstruction of Iraq, the supply of oil and gas to countries, and cooperation in various issues, at the time, were tackled.

It was said then that the project could be expanded to include most countries in the region.

The Egyptian gas export comes as part of an Egyptian plan to distribute the surplus to the countries of the region and transfer it to the Turkish and European markets. The foundations of this plan were laid by Sameh Fahmy, the Egyptian Minister of Energy, in 1999.

⁽⁴⁾ Hezbollah Leader Announces Iran Sending a Fueled Ship to Lebanon, France 24, 19/8/2021, <https://bit.ly/3hWai3d>

⁽⁵⁾ The Lebanese Presidency, Providing Gas to Lebanon from Egyptian Gas, BBC Arabic, 19/8/2021, <https://arabic.cnn.com/middle-east/article/2021/08/19/lebanon-us-egyptian-gas-electricity-us-jordan>



Memorandums of understanding were signed with various parties on the issue.⁶

A number of developments pertinent to this issue can be stated as follows:

1- Project Formal Map:

The map that is currently being discussed is agreed upon by all relevant countries.

OPEC contributed to the project, funded part of it, and officially announced the funding of the Syria part in 2006.

Egypt⁷ also officially announced the matter in another context.

The line and its phases were discussed without publishing official maps.

The "Library of⁸ Congress" published the map of the line, citing the Central Intelligence Agency of the United States.⁹

⁽⁶⁾ Arab Gas Pipeline, Hydrocarbon»s technologie, <https://www.hydrocarbons-technologie.com/projects/arab-gas-pipeline-agp/>


⁽⁷⁾ Arab gas pipelines project. OPEC fund, <https://opecfund.org/operations/list/arab-gas-pipeline-project>

⁽⁸⁾ The interview with Egyptian Energy Minister Sameh Fahmy can be reviewed in the official OPEC magazine in English published in 2005, p. 6 link: https://www.opec.org/opec_web/static_files_project/media/downloads/publications/OB012005.pdf

⁽⁹⁾ Middle East oil and gas, Library of Congress, 2007, <https://www.loc.gov/resource/g7421h.ct002142/?r=0,091,0,216,0,574,0,229,0>.

Map No. 2:

Gas and oil lines in the Middle East, according to the Library of Congress 2007





The map reveals a link in the line towards Israel that is not always talked about, as it extends from the port of "Aqaba" towards the Palestinian area of "Ashkelon" in the territories controlled by Israel.

The U.S. Energy Data Authority published a map of the project in its final form completed in 2013 in a study on lines in¹⁰ the Middle East, as shown in map 3, which showed that despite the presence of pipes, the line is out of service and the only link that functions is from "Ashkelon" to "Aqaba".

(10) Overview of oil and gas in Eastern Mediterranean region, August, 05, 2013, P2, https://www.eia.gov/international/content/analysis/regions_of_interest/Eastern_Mediterranean/eastern-mediterranean.pdf.

Map No. 3:

published by the US Energy Data Authority in 2013





2- The source and direction of gas in the project

Egypt is the source of the main Arab gas line, because since the beginning of the current millennium it has found a surplus in quantities, with an expectation of increasing production as a result of the expected discoveries, but after a few years, Israel has become a major source of gas production.

In 2020 the pipelines for gas transport between the two countries have been reversed for the first time; and Israel was able to export gas to Egypt, which is considered the most important event ¹¹ after the peace agreement.

Egypt, as such, is the main center for gas liquefaction and export in the region. Greece and Cyprus may join Israel in a step to grant Egypt this favor in liquefying gas.

Egypt chaired the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum ¹² for political and economic reasons, thus forming the for-front of the forum in the export process that may extend towards Turkey and Europe, which means great satisfaction to them.

It is expected that the countries of Europe will support the project in the event of completion of the line, to connect it to the "Napco" line in Turkey, where the gas will be in the interest of European countries seeking to diversify their sources.

3- Current status of the project and completion needs

The basic stages of the project are considered complete.

If the goal is to deliver gas to Lebanon, then the main infrastructure is in place.

If the goal is to deliver gas to Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon; the parts are in place as well.

(11) Israel Starts Exporting Gas to Egypt, France 24 ,15/1/2021, <https://bit.ly/3tMDhev>

(12) For more on the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum see: Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum Regional Cooperation amid Conflict of Interest, Natural Resources Governance Institute ,1/3/2021. <https://resourcegovernance.org/analysis-tools/publications/east-mediterranean-gas-forum-regional-cooperation-amid-conflicting-en>



Some points in the project, however, need to be completed; namely:

1. The breakdowns in the "Sheikh Zuwayd" area of the Sinai: need to be monitored. This line was exposed to successive explosions. The most prominent of which was the explosion of the control room known as (Bluff No. 7: pipe closures,¹³ and the main explosions that took place in 2011, and 2012 when the line was blown more than once to witness¹⁴ explosion No.15. It was exposed to at least one explosion in 2013 in the same area. Things were then relatively calm until 2020, as it was exposed to two new explosions in "Al-Arish". Later, there were more than 30 large explosions, let alone, small ones.¹⁵

2. Failure in Syrian territory: The line was subjected to explosions in the south of Syria and in the vicinity of Damascus, in addition to the explosions in the Syrian desert near Homs.¹⁶

More than once, the Syrian regime attributed the problem of electricity to the explosion of the line.

This does not mean that the line contains gas coming from Egypt, which means that the regime is trying to throw the ball into the court of explosions that occur to evade responsibility for the weakness of the electrical network, or that the pipe is used contrary to what was intended; which is supplying the Damascus electricity stations with gas from the surrounding fields.

3. Testing readiness through a trial pumping: Maintenance operations do not need a long time, because the pipes are there; which means that we are talking about months in the maxim to carry out maintenance operations, test the pipes, and follow up on the various problems, if the activating decision is made.

4. Securing and protecting the line: The security situation is still difficult in Syria and Egypt.

(13) A new explosion targeting gas pipelines in El-Arish, France24, 12/7/2011, <https://www.france24.com/en/-20110712egypt-israel-jordan-energy-gas-blast>

(14) The bombing of the Egyptian gas line to Israel for the 15th time, 22/7/2012, https://www.bbc.com/arabic/middleeast/2012/07/120721_egypt_gas_supply_15

(15) For the second time during the month of the bombing of the Egyptian gas pipeline, 24/12/2020, <https://bit.ly/3tM4EFo>

(16) The explosion of a gas line that leads to the interruption of electricity to Syria, Al-Quds al-Arabi, 24/8/2020, <https://bit.ly/3Emvnx6>



No one can guarantee that the line will not be blown up again, especially since parties in the region have no interest in making the line functional, especially Iran, which targets it in the areas controlled by its militias. The task of protecting and securing the line will not be easy, because it requires many issues, because, securing the line is harder than operating it. If there is an Iranian decision that this line poses a threat to them, the line will not work for two consecutive days.

5. Financing the project and the time required for its implementation: As long as the project is almost complete, the expenses of financing the maintenance operations may be the responsibility of local governments, meaning that Egypt will maintain the damaged gas pipelines in Sinai at the expense of its budget. In Jordan and Israel, there are no problems in the line, so the two governments will often not have to pay any additional amounts. The line heading towards Lebanon does not have problems. If it needed, the Lebanese government is expected to bear the cost of maintenance as it will be low and affordable.

Likewise, in Syria, the Syrian regime can bear the cost of maintenance, and in the event that one of the parties invokes its inability to secure the costs, the technical teams necessary for maintenance, or even spare parts, it is expected to receive assistance from one of the strong parties in the project, in which case it may be Egypt or one of the regional or international organizations specialized in these issues.

6. The expected revenues of the project: Lebanon's need exceeds 3 gigawatts of electricity, and 4 gigawatts may reach within the next two years on annual bases, while the gas will provide Deir Ammar station, which generates only half of the gigawatts, and therefore the reliance will be on the Jordanian electricity network, which will give Lebanon the rest of its electricity needs directly; and the Syrian regime will benefit from electricity, as well as gas, which means that Jordan will give Lebanon and Syria for certain prices to be agreed upon, while the gas provided to Syria, Lebanon and Jordan is Egyptian, and will be paid for, and if it comes from other countries, Egypt will pay these countries, and will make adjustments to its price, as expected so that it would make a profit from such deals.



Second: The importance of the project:

The Arab Gas Line project gains importance at various levels.

They are as follows:

1- Economic importance:

The countries that will benefit from the project in the short term suffer from many problems in the field of energy. Syria and Lebanon are currently exhausted countries at the energy level; electricity is absent from their homes and streets most of the time. Therefore, gas supplies are expected to give more hours to turn on the electricity in homes, which will affect the improvement of the daily life of the citizen, as well as securing electricity for facilities that suffer greatly from the loss of electricity, which causes the disruption of the remaining simple production in Syria and acceptable production in Lebanon.

The economic importance of the project for Jordan is in providing new opportunities for the transit of gas from the source to other countries expected to be covered in the future. Moreover, the gas exporting countries will benefit from the possibility of entering new markets despite their being relatively small. It is expected to be a starting station for the export of gas to the rest of the region, including Turkey. It is in the interest of these countries to gain a large market such as Turkey, then European markets.

2- Political Significance:

The gas line is characterized by being Arab, and the talk about it comes within the framework of Egyptian initiatives to stand in the face of the Iranian expansion in the region, which is expanding in the Arab region, according to the statements by its supporters.



Therefore, the "New Levant" project was launched, and its importance comes from Egypt restoring its role in the Arab arena, and in Arabs restoring their role economically and politically integration-wise after the decline suffered.

The project, therefore, may expand, or may be built upon, the thing that increases coordination and cooperation within the framework of the Arab House.

It should be noted that in the post-Arab spring era, the Arab world is reshaping its regional scene, after more than a decade of being shaken up.

It is consolidating existing agreements, including the "New Levant" project, from which many Arab and regional parties, including the United States, are benefiting from the implementation and success of the project, as it serves a number of objectives that it is trying to achieve after it decided to withdraw its forces from the region; the most important of which is to maintain the stability of the region after years of wars and internal and external conflicts, and to strengthen its allies in the region, as well as to confront the expansion of Iran which is seeking to circumvent US sanctions.

At the same time, Israel sees itself as part of the Middle East space, and therefore tries to participate in this project, and even support its success, by strengthening normalization and trade agreements with the countries of the region, and cooperating in promoting innovative projects, training the workforce for the world of high technology, and transferring knowledge to desalination.

Moreover, the Israeli aspiration to participate in the project includes potentially opening a channel of communication with Syria and Iraq, which will constitute the beginning of negotiations on a future normalization agreement.

The implementation of this project, which has regional dimensions, enjoys Western support, especially the support of the United States, which enhances the status of its allies in the region and their ability to influence.

The project was also meant to undermine Iranian influence allowing Israel to open another front to confront it in the region.

It serves the national security interests of Israel adding it to another coalition in the region.



On the other hand, because of Egypt's partnership with Israel on gas issues, and within the framework of the course of the Arab normalization with it, it is expected that the connection through the pipelines will form a greater entanglement in relations, and will increase its ability to discharge its production, both in the region and across it to Europe.

It can be said therefore that the "water-for-electricity" agreement recently signed between Jordan and Israel in the UAE under American auspices comes within this context.



Third: Project benefits to the actors in the region

The main actors can be divided into direct ones who are affected by operating the line, and indirect ones. The points of influence on each can be configured as follows:

Figure No. 1:

Implications for the main actors







Country/Interest	Range	The gas!	Electricity
 Israel	Short Term	Sale of gas to Egypt	-
	Long Term	Sale of gas to Jordan in the future	The possibility of investing in the electricity sector within the region
 Egypt	Short Term	Sale of gas to Jordan, Syria and Lebanon	-
	Long Term	Sale of gas to Turkey and Europe	The possibility of investing in the electricity sector within the region
 Jordan	Short Term	Buying gas at relatively cheap prices due to the passage of pipelines	Export of electricity to Syria, Lebanon and Iraq
	Long Term	Construction of liquefaction stations	Power Plant Development
 Syrian	Short Term	Getting gas at a relatively cheap price	Obtaining electricity from Jordan
	Long Term	Potential for collaboration with the Forum on average energy reserve issues	Installation of new power stations and maintenance of the ones already there
 Lebanon	Short Term	Getting gas at a relatively cheap price	Obtaining electricity from Jordan
	Long Term	Potential for collaboration with the Forum on average energy reserve issues	Installation of new power stations and maintenance of the ones already there
 Iraq	Short Term	-	-
	Long Term	Getting gas needs.	Getting electricity needs

Figure No. 2:

Effects on indirect actors in the region

Actor	Range	Benefits
 Turkey	Short Term	-
	Long Term	Obtaining one of its objectives by being the pathway for Eastern Mediterranean gas passing to Europe and obtaining the gas at a relatively low price
 Cyprus and Greece	Short Term	-
	Long Term	Increasing the likelihood of understanding with Turkey after it obtains part of what it wants from passing the gas line through its territory
 Russia	Short Term	The possibility that Russian companies will be the contractors to extend and manage pipelines through Syrian territory towards Turkey at a cost of up to 250\$ million
	Long Term	Loss of part of its share in its main markets in Turkey and Europe, and the possibility of having its hand on Syrian gas contracts in the eastern Mediterranean
 Iran	Short Term	Operation or maintenance of power plants by Iranian companies
	Long Term	Loss of gas and oil supply to the Syrian regime and the project's clash with the Islamic gas line project
 Syrian Democratic Forces	Short Term	Declining imports of oil by the Syrian regime
	Long Term	Decreased importance of areas controlled by these forces
 Hezbollah	Short Term	A slight decrease in the importance of the fuel smuggling trade Hezbollah's influence on the Lebanese electricity and energy profile has declined
	Long Term	Iran's role in Lebanon, Syria, and Iraq has declined, affecting its role
 The Opposition	Short Term	-
	Long Term	The passage of gas pipelines through the opposition-controlled areas toward Turkey constitutes opportunities to establish a power plant



Fourth: Evaluation of the project

In purely theoretical terms, the Arabian Gas Line project is realistic and achievable. It is expected to be done soon.

Practically; however, there are a number of obstacles and issues to be taken into account while talking about its transformation into a real project in progress, namely:

1- Time frame for implementation:

The probability of gas delivery to Lebanon is estimated between 4-6 months, i.e. we are talking about 120-180 days, which is a standard period, and can be, with some reservations, divided as follows:



Table No. 2:

Expected periods of operation of the line with some observations about it

Stage & Duration	Expected task	Notes
<p>Phase (1) 30 days</p>	<p>Line status assessment by technical committees in the four countries</p>	<p>Committees can be easily operative, and the duration is expected to be sufficient in principle</p>
<p>Phase (2) 30 days</p>	<p>Study the reports and review the problems contained in them</p>	<p>The obstacle will be the ability to solve the problems mentioned in the reports. Although the Syrian Minister of Oil confirmed the readiness of the line, this may not be completely accurate</p>
<p>Phase (3) 90 days</p>	<p>Maintenance and testing the lines</p>	<p>It is expected that maintenance operations will be carried out in the south of Syria and the Sinai region; and ensure that the line is ready in practice</p>
<p>Phase (4) 30 days</p>	<p>Experimental Pumping</p>	<p>The trial pumping process can start in the sixth month if things go smoothly</p>

Source: Table prepared by the researcher based on technical estimates.



2- Safe environment for operating the line:

In Syria, Egypt and Lebanon, there are areas where the line may be disrupted by different parties that do not want it to work, and it is expected that Hezbollah and Iranian militias are the main bodies that are keen to disrupt the operation. In the Egyptian case, there may be greater order and control than anywhere else; which means that the gas will reach Jordan, and it would benefit from it to generate electricity and give it to Lebanon and Syria. In the Syrian territory; however, there is no force that can guarantee that the line will continue to operate smoothly, unless, for example, the Russians decide to carry out the task of protecting it. This may not be in their economic interest, unless they guarantee that the line will not be extended to Turkey in the long term, for example, or if they have negotiations on something else with the countries of the Gas Forum, such as sharing shares in the Mediterranean or reaching certain political agreements.

3- The political environment:

The project comes in an Arabic formula to undermine the influence of Turkey and Iran in Syria and the region. Furthermore, it harms the Russian gas share in Europe and Turkey in the long term. Turkey, however, may find in it a fulfillment of its goal in the conflict with the Forum countries, which makes it closer to being satisfied by the agreement. The Russians may agree to the matter if an understanding about gas shares in the sea is reached, meaning that the work of the line will be followed by oil and gas exploration off the Syrian coast by the Russians. Iran will be the biggest loser in all that. Assad could make this sacrifice in exchange for being recycled or for achieving economic gains.

This means that the Syrian regime is before two options worst than each other: - to reject the offer and keep on tying itself with Iran and its supplies, and therefore the sanctions and the siege imposed on the entire regime will continue. - to accept the offer, which will be an entry point for lifting the sanctions, and establishing relations with neighboring countries; and that would be at the expense of Iran.



4- Financing:

Financing the maintenance of the line may not be a major challenge because its main structure is in place, but if the line is to extend towards the Turkish territory, it needs a quarter of a billion dollars.

Turkey and the European Union may share its funding with Russian implementation.

This extension, however, will not hinder gas reaching Lebanon and Syria.



Fifth: Paths and Scenarios

The Syrian issue is one of the most complex issues in the world now, where local, international and regional powers and actors intersect and overlap, their political and economic interests contradict each other, and solutions to security, military, and even humanitarian issues have been put forward that are less important than the Arab gas line. They have not been implemented or put into action.

This raises doubts about the potential for implementing the Arab gas project in the context of the same conditions.

Many regional communities believe that time and conditions are ready and ripe for project implementation; especially with the parties concerned feeling that there is a climate for calming things down.

Such a situation can not be relied upon.

As such, three possible scenarios for the project path arise:

The first scenario: The failure of the project (the bear scenario):

In the case of Iraq, there was talk of an electrical network connected to the Gulf network during the era of the Maliki government.

Many years elapsed without any advancement despite the facilities provided by the Gulf countries; the project still has not worked nor entered into implementation, despite the completion of most of its parts.

What then would make the Syrian or Lebanese situation different, when the players are the same ones?!

Knowing that the failure of the project is the most likely probability, as it is expected not to be approved by the Iranians and Hezbollah, because its Secretary-General, Hassan Nasrallah, doubted the success of the initiative, and the intentions behind the Arab gas line.



Iran,¹⁷ on the other hand, is expected to increase its presence in the Syrian arena economically, militarily, and politically to thwart the agreement.

Moreover, it is not yet known whether the Russians will agree definitively, or only negotiate the matter.

In Lebanon, Iran's allies will stand against the project, but most other Lebanese teams will welcome it, and may help in the process of implementation.

Scenario (2): Temporary success (the duck scenario)

The gas may flow during the expected period or a little bit beyond it, and indeed it may reach Lebanon and Syria, with Jordan beginning the operations of connecting the electricity network and sending the necessary electricity to the two countries; but it is likely that the forces not benefiting from the agreement will start to obstruct the project by blowing up lines, or obstructing technical operations, including Lebanese companies, countries, or a team that may find its share inappropriate.

Add to all that the situation in Syria.

Moreover, attacks in "Sinai" targeting the line and severing the main artery of the project may increase.

These are actions that may hinder completion, especially if associated with the tacit approval of a powerful party, which has found that it has no interest in continuing the game.

As such, the line may operate for a while, and stop for another, until the negotiation process tilts towards stopping it or operating according to the weighting of the interests of the disrupting parties.

(17) Al- 'Arabi al-Jadid, 23/9/2021, <https://bit.ly/2VOnjnv>



Scenario (3): The Flamingo scenario: The line works well

The parties may actually agree on putting the project to work, and the gas flow would begin, and the Jordanian electricity network possibly delivering part of the electricity needed for Syria and Lebanon, with electricity and gas flowing to Lebanon to cover at least one-third of its need within a year to two years.


It is also expected to supply it with 1 Giga, and it may supply Syria with up to half of its need for electricity, which means a significant improvement in the situation in the next two years.

The process of extending the line to Turkish territory will continue to be negotiated until a later stage, but this will be the goal of most of the parties that have sought to make the line work well.

The Lebanese and Syrian markets are only a crossing point, with the goal being Europe.

Figure No. 3:

Potential scenarios for the future of the Arabian gas line



Conclusion and assessment

The Arab gas line project was agreed upon at the beginning of the current millennium; and work on it began through several stages, the last of which was implemented in 2008 in Syria, and the delivery of the line was completed from Egypt to mid-Syria, and for reasons related to the Russian company, the implementation was suspended.

The line did not reach Turkey, and with the establishment of the Egyptian and Syrian revolutions, the project was completely disrupted, as the line was bombed in Egypt and Syria, and it was used to deliver gas internally without achieving its objectives.

Talk about the Arab gas line resumed after Lebanon's economic crisis, and it was agreed to restart it after the evaluation and maintenance of the broken parts. It seems that the project is going towards implementation in the interests of Egypt and Israel as gas exporters, with Jordan being a corridor and producer of electricity, and Syria and Lebanon as countries needing electricity on the other hand. There is a high probability of delivering gas to Iraq shortly after its operation, as well as electricity through Jordan.

Although the gas line is characterized by being Arab, and Egypt and its supporting countries seek through it to restore the influence of the Arab countries in the region in the face of the increasing influence of Turkey and Iran, Turkey will welcome the project if the line is connected to "Kilis" as planned, and thus connect it to the "Annaco" pipeline, which is reflected positively on Turkey, and resolves part of its issues in energy security and conflict in the Mediterranean, and European countries will welcome the project as they need to diversify gas sources. Iran, which has extensive influence on the ground, will stand in the way of the project, making it a major disruptor.

The project is not in Russia's favor, but is in conflict with its interests, as it will affect Russia's share in European markets.

It is not either believed that Turkey will agree, unless it is given a green light for gas exploration off the Syrian coasts; and thus becomes part of the project as a whole, or given certain political gains.

The current technical status of the project indicates the possibility of operating it in six months at the latest, but the political and security environment may not support that.



Despite the economic and political importance of the project; however, the possibility of not operating it remains the most likely scenario, with the possibility that it will work for some time, which is accompanied by negotiations that may terminate the work of the line at any moment, if no agreement between the parties is reached.

At the political level, certain conditions have arisen in the region and the world in the post-Trump phase, which may push for the completion of this project, especially with the ongoing Arab openness with the Syrian regime on the one hand, and the regional reconciliation taking place in the region, especially between Turkey on the one hand, and the UAE and Egypt on the other. This may be reflected in the future relationship with Syria, which sees itself as one of the most beneficiaries of the project. In such a case, the temptations provided to the Syrian regime may help it disengage from the Iranian grip on its decision.



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