



Dimensions
for Strategic Studies

Analytical Report



Russian influence in Africa China Competition Facing the West

Prepared by:
Dr. Hakim Aladi Najmuddin

APR 2022
www.dimensionscenter.net



Dimensions for Strategic Studies

Dimensions Centre for Strategic Studies (DCSS) is think tank, dedicated to the study of the Middle East and North Africa affairs, provides the Arab readers with a substantive insight on the region's political, economic and social issues and dynamics.

The DCSS was founded in the United Kingdom on January 2020 ,1, and is headquartered in London.

Dimensions Center for Strategic Studies is interested in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) affairs in particular, addressing influences the region has and the effects of this region's interactions with the rest of the world.

We strive to provide an open and accessible space in order to inform relevant persons of experts and academic readers alike, in a simplified style far from the complexities brought by experts, technicians and academics.

We are keen to provide topics in an intensive manner that goes in line with the challenges of modern times and in brief way which can meet the needs of researchers and readers as well.



Introduction

From the 1950s to the 1970s, the Soviet Union had a tremendous impact in “post-colonial” Africa, where it was seen as an alternative to Western imperialism and capitalism.

Some “post-colonial” African leaders struck an alliance with the Soviet Union through ideologies ranging from socialism to Marxism-Leninism.

During their independence campaigns, they received financial and military assistance from Moscow.

While the Soviet Union's influence in Africa has dwindled today, Russia's influence in recent years has been mounting, out of ideological consideration and relying on military and security aspects to achieve the continent's geopolitical ambitions.

Russia's recent moves in the Republic of Mali confirm that it has found an effective model that has already been applied in the Central African Republic, and that it is prepared to do what it can to reduce the influence of other international forces and to crowd out other competitors in Africa, especially the United States and France, through intensive campaigns that interfere with the interests of African government officials, even if they threaten the continent's progress in civil governance and the rule of law.

Below is a review of the literature and field reports on foreign ambitions and Russia's presence in Africa and its objectives, providing examples in both the Central African Republic and Mali.

In doing so, we deduce what the data indicate and the trends of current events.



First: Russian influence on the continent

In recent years, Russia is consolidating its influence in Africa more than any other foreign player, quietly rebuilding relations with various countries of the continent and strengthening economic and military cooperation.¹

Although its trade relations with the continent are unequal to a force like China, Russia's strategy, which arouses fears of the West, seems profitable and achievable, especially in light of the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the silence of several African countries towards the Russian process.²

Russia's spheres of influence in Africa can be divided into three main areas, namely military and security influence, economic influence, and political influence.

1. Military and security influence

Military and security aspects were one of the largest areas in which "Russian-African" relations have advanced, because a number of African countries have had to face escalating security challenges.

Russian security companies provide protection services to senior officials in the continent's countries, as well as training local security forces and providing cybersecurity services.

In recent years, Russia has surpassed China as Africa's leading arms supplier with 35% of total shipments to the continent, followed by the United States (9.6%) and France 6.9%.³

(1) Maxim Matusevich. «Russia in Africa: A Search for Continuity in a Post-Cold War Era». Insight Turkey, Vol. 21, No. 1, Winter 2019: bit.ly/3Eobq9P

(2) Mahama Tawat. «Russia-Ukraine war: decoding how African countries voted at the UN», The Conversation, 08/03/2022: bit.ly/3JlfJ0I

(3) Aude Fleurant, et al. «Trends in International Arms Transfers, 2016», SIPRI Fact Sheet, February 2017: bit.ly/3uBAWVs



Since 2015, Russia has signed a series of bilateral military cooperation agreements with African countries, in which Russian weapons are considered cheap and inexpensive compared to their United States counterparts; and negotiations with Russia to purchase these weapons are often far from the human rights concerns raised by countries such as France, the United States of America or the United Kingdom.⁴

For example, in 2014, the Federal Republic of Nigeria was forced to resort to Russia to purchase 12 attack helicopters after the United States refused to supply the country with weapons to fight Boko Haram, which constitutes the peak of its attacks and activities at the time. The United States' rejection was based on allegations of human rights violations by Nigerian forces. Similarly, five countries (Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger) in the Sahel/ coastal region facing a violent armed group crisis went to Russia to request military support in 2018.

In addition to the above, Africa's allies such as France have been accused by the public opinion of complicating the security crisis and exploiting the security situation to achieve their economic interests. Russia has found open space in Mali, the former French colony and one of the strategically important countries, after France and its partners decided in 2021 to withdraw their forces engaged in combat activities against terrorists in that country and in the Sahel since 2013. One of the reasons for the withdrawal identified by France was the existence of "multiple obstacles" by the military junta that seized power in 2020.⁵

While France subsequently announced that it would redeploy its forces to Mali's neighboring State of the Niger, the military junta strengthened its military relations with Russia, which confirmed the provision of military assistance, and allegations of the arrival of Russian mercenaries or trainers in strategic locations in that country.⁶

(4) Jakob Hedenskog. Russia is Stepping Up its Military Cooperation in Africa. FOI, December 2018: foi.se/rest-api/report/FOI20%MEMO%206604

(5) Hakim Alladi Najmuddin. «ECOWAS Sanctions on Mali and the French-Russian-Chinese Trio of Competition», Al-Jazeera Studies Center, 19/01/2022: studies.aljazeera.net/en/article/5256

(6) Previous source



However, Russia does not always follow the right approach when it comes to its presence in Africa, as it has followed in the past years "informal" and illegal procedures that include the deployment and use of mercenaries in at least ten African countries, including Mozambique and Angola, and the use of electronic networks to promote them and provide weapons in exchange for access to natural resources.

The fact that the President of the Central African Republic, Faustin Archange Touadera, today retains control of his country with the help of some 2,300 Russian mercenaries is a vivid example of the above. In 2018, Tuadera requested the assistance of Russian military trainers to stabilize his country after it was controlled by a group of the armed opposition, as he has difficulty in lifting the arms embargo imposed by the United Nations. Moscow sent Wagner mercenaries and provided weapons to help local security forces protect important gold and diamond mines in the north of the country. However, it has also been reported that the proceeds from these mines go to the ⁷ Wagner group.

Touadera even appointed Russian named Valery Zakharov as the National Security Advisor, and Wagner's soldiers adopted Wagner as his personal presidential guard. Moscow played a crucial role in his re-election in December 2020 by arresting critics of the Russian presence from the opposition and conducting a vigorous media campaign for his benefit and for the benefit of Russian activities in the country.

Amidst criticism of Wagner Group worldwide as being run by Yevgeny Prigozhin, assistant to Russian president Vladimir Putin, and accusing the mercenaries, affiliated with the company, of committing crimes and destabilization, especially in Libya, Sudan, Mozambique and the Central African Republic, Moscow has repeatedly denied its relationship with the company, while Putin pointed out in one of his statements that the group is neither owned by the Russian state nor represented by it, saying: "It is a private company that has special interests associated with extracting energy resources, including various resources such as gold or precious ⁸ stones."

(7) Nathalia Dukhan. «State of Prey Proxies, Predators, and Profiteers in the Central African Republic». The century, October 2020: bit.ly/3vhKBjc

(8) Carol Guensburg. «Russia Steadily Rebuilding Presence in Africa», VOA, 21/02/2022: bit.ly/3LVWlCq



2. Economic influence

Given the old approach, it is hard to detach Russia's military and security influence in Africa from its economic influence. However, it is also unfair to limit all bilateral agreements and economic relations to military cooperation alone. Although Russia provides less than 1% of FDI to Africa, trade between Russia and African countries grew by 185% between 2005 and 2015. It has doubled since 2015 to reach about \$20 billion annually, according to the president of the African Export-Import Bank ⁹ Benedict Uramah.

Russia exported \$14 billion worth of goods and services while its imports were nearly \$5 billion of African products. Agricultural products, including fruit, cocoa, coffee, and potatoes, constitute one-third of Russia's imports from Africa.

The “Russian-African” summit held in October 2019 in the Russian city of Sochi generated contracts with more than 30 African countries to supply them with weapons and military equipment. Russian companies, including those representing commercial and State-subsidized interests, have invested in security, technology, and industries in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Central African Republic through the extraction of natural resources such as oil, gas, coltan, cobalt, gold, diamonds and others.¹⁰

These Russian companies were led by Rosal, which excavates for metals such as aluminum in Guinea, and Rosatom, which has been exploring and prospecting for uranium potential in Namibia for more than 10 years. In Zimbabwe, there is a joint venture between the Russian company JSC Afromet and the Zimbabwean company Pen East Ltd, to develop one of the world's largest platinum mineral deposits. Alrosa, the world's largest diamond mining company, has moved to expand its operations in Zimbabwe.¹¹

(9) Russia's Increasing Trade Ties with Africa, Russia Briefing, 28/10/2021: bit.ly/3vbN2nz.

(10) Jideofor Adibe. «What does Russia really want from Africa?», Brookings, 14/11/2019: brook.gs/368a6eg

(11) “Uncut Geopolitics: Russia's Armed Commercialism in the C.A.R. Diamond Trade”, MP Strategic Group, 06/03/2021: bit.ly/3rpbOPP



In Angola, Alrosa has increased its stake in the local company Catoca, to %41, in a deal that provides Alrosa with a large production base outside Russia. Catoca operates under the Russian administration although its ownership is shared with Angola.¹²

In addition to the above, Russia's agenda included the use of its state-owned oil and gas industries to generate new revenue sources. Russian oil companies are therefore moving towards Africa, ranging from large investments in the oil and gas sector in Algeria, Libya, Nigeria and Ghana to the Ivory Coast.¹³

In Nigeria, the local oil and gas exploration company Oranto Petroleum plans to develop 21 oil assets in 17 African countries, with the help of Rosneft, Russia's largest oil producer.¹⁴

What makes Africa a fertile ground for Russian companies is the lack of stable and cheap electricity in several countries on the continent. Russia had a huge market for the energy sector, which made African countries turn to it. Today, Russian state-owned companies are active on the continent, such as Gazprom, Lukoil, Rostek and Rosatom. Rosatom has signed agreements and memorandums of understanding with 18 African countries to develop their nuclear power on attractive loans and terms, including Rwanda, Egypt, Ghana, Kenya, Zambia, Nigeria and Ethiopia.¹⁵

(12) ALROSA is to build up its stake in Catoca to %41», Rough Polished, 29/09/2017: rough-polished.com/en/news/108326.html

(13) J. Peter Pham. Russia's Return to Africa. Atlantic Council, 14/03/2014: bit.ly/37dV1sc

(14) Tsvetana Paraskova. Nigerian Firm to Partner with Rosneft to Develop 21 African Oil Assets. Oil Price, 24/05/2018: bit.ly/3O24689

(15) Joe Penney. «Vladimir Putin signed dozens of MOUs with African countries this week but can't match China», Quartz Africa, 25/10/2019: bit.ly/3KzGXHU



3. Political influence

The Russian influence in African politics can be limited to providing political technology while employing the Russians in organizing election campaigns and developing strategies for African politicians to overcome their rivals and opponents. Russia has also realized that winning the African side will work in its interest at the international level, given the number of African countries in international organizations.

Besides contracting with African elites on an individual basis, Russia does not offer an ideological vision of African countries as the Soviets previously attempted, and it has not forced African politicians to adopt and implement democracy as the West does. Russia and China recognize the importance of national sovereignty with indifference to transparency, governance, and the fight against corruption. Russia has been criticized for using mercenaries and electronic networks to mislead and interfere in national elections in order to seize wider influence and change the continent's governance landscape.

Russia's political influence in Africa reinforces the interests of the ruling political elite, which has found its will to suit Russia's interest, which is no different from African leaders' cooperation with Western interest networks to strengthen their power.

In addition to the above, Russia's relations with African leaders are based on varying degrees, and it enjoys a positive view among some African parties as an alternative and reliable international superpower, as it has been able to position itself as a strong broker in Libya through various strategic steps. Moscow followed this by strengthening its ties with Algeria and Egypt in North Africa, and with the military governments in Mali and Sudan, and replaced France in the Central African Republic, while implementing various strategies to expand its influence across Southern Africa.

Second: Challenges facing Russian influence

The challenges facing Russian influence in Africa are to face economic powers such as China and new players such as Turkey and Japan, and to confront traditional allies who are rearranging their plans and approaches towards the continent, as in the American orientation under the administrations of Presidents Donald Trump and Joe Biden, as well as the recent EU-Africa summit, and the developments of the geopolitical landscape in West Africa and the Sahel region.

A brief breakdown of these challenges:

1- American Role and Influence

Recent moves from the US side indicate that the “Russian-African ” alliance reinforces Russia's international standing and plans in challenging the current international security system, which is dominated by the United States and Euro-Atlantic Europe. The Russian success in the international forum, taking advantage of its friendship with African States, has led to criticism of the Russian presence in those States.

Indeed, some American politicians have called for the the Truman¹⁶ Doctrine, adopted by the United States in the 1950s, to prevent Soviet expansion in any part of the world.

In 2018, former US national security adviser John Bolton accused Russia of selling arms to African countries in exchange for their votes at the UN.

Bolton said: "The brutal practices of China and Russia hinder economic growth in Africa, and threaten the financial independence of African countries, American investment, US military operations, and US citizens."

(16) Dennis Merrill. (2006). “The Truman doctrine: containing communism and modernity”, *Presidential Studies Quarterly*, 36(1), March 2006: www.jstor.org/stable/27552744



He added that these Russian actions "keep strong men in power, weaken peace and security and run counter to the best interests of the African people." ¹⁷

The American and Russian sides use their propaganda outlets and their funded and friendly NGOs to support their narratives and rally public opinion against each other.

Some researchers have expressed concerns about the possibility of conflict between the United States and Russia and their proxies in Africa in the event of a conflict between Russian interests and American interests in a country such as Mozambique, which enjoys huge investments from the American company Exxon Mobil in the natural gas sector, while Russia deploys mercenaries in the country, which may create tensions.

2- Russia and China in Africa: an alliance or a competition?

China occupies a larger position than Russia in most African countries, because of the fact that Chinese loans and efforts contributed to providing the necessary infrastructure in these countries, and because of the large volume of trade exchange between China and Africa. However, Russia and China are the same in terms of the general outlook of most Africans, as China and Russia are considered allies and "companions of the path" with Africans in their struggles and efforts to develop. Russia and China leave no opportunity but remind Africans that they have not occupied the continent and have not treated its people as France, Britain, or the United States; and that their goal with the continent is to work and cooperate instead of providing assistance, which may give the impression that they are more respectful to Africans and the continent, compared to traditional allies who are often accused of "denigrating" the peoples of the continent.

(17) Remarks by National Security Advisor Ambassador John R. Bolton on the Trump Administration's New Africa Strategy», White House Archives, 12/13/2018: bit.ly/3v7LKtG



While the "Russian-Chinese" relationship at the international level leads to saying that Russia and China will cooperate and share within Africa instead of competing and struggling, the recent Russian Sochi summit confirms that Moscow prefers a competitive approach with all other international parties, including China, as it followed Beijing's example in 2019 by canceling 20\$ billion of African countries' outstanding debts, and also revealed plans to double trade with African countries to 40\$ billion annually.¹⁸

In addition to the above, Russia's focus in Africa was on the security and military aspects, while China focuses on the economic aspects and construction of various infrastructures. Russia's recent moves, however, could create a clash with China, Africa's largest trading partner; especially if Beijing perceives that as a Moscow threat to its interests, knowing that China is also investing huge sums in mining sectors and experimenting with a new security and military model in some African countries, including South Sudan and Mali.

3- Confronting France in the Sahel

French foreign policy focuses on Africa is triggered by the importance former French colonies mean to Paris. France has tried to preserve the African territories it previously occupied through various strategies and a series of "neocolonial" economic policies, despite decolonization processes and attempts to reduce French domination by some of the leaders of these countries.

If a few years ago China became a threat to French interests in Africa, traditional French hegemony began to erode in large parts of the continent, especially in Central Africa and the Sahel region, where Russia recently emerged as a strong competitor, and caused French security concerns, while relations between Paris and Moscow were strained against this background.

(18) "Putin: Russia has written off 20\$ billion of African debt", UAWIRE, 24/10/2019: bit.ly/3MjheUP



Recent developments in Libya, the Central African Republic and Mali¹⁹ suggest that France is losing its strategic niche, in exchange for the proliferation of innovative foreign policy strategies by competitors such as Russia.²⁰

The tension between France and Russia in sub-Saharan Africa can be seen in the recent sanctions imposed by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) on Mali, where France lined up behind the decisions of the African Union and the regional bloc against the military junta in this country, due to the postponement of the elections until 2026. Paris also sought to strengthen these sanctions at the international level, and part of its strategy was to use its rotating EU Presidency to strengthen European sanctions. However, the French attempt in the Security Council was hampered by the fact that Russia and China prevented the Council from supporting the new sanctions.²¹

While Russia seems to be winning the game because the leaders of the Central African Republic and Mali are on Russia's side, Moscow and Paris are jointly pursuing their economic interests and intervening in conflict zones, through arms deals. Given that France manufactures its own weapons as an expression of its strategic independence, which relies heavily on the sale of French arms abroad, a clash between Moscow and Paris may occur because of the repercussions of Russian arms proliferation on the French arms industry.

On the other hand, France and Russia have formed civic networks and electronic institutions to promote their presence on the continent. Although European studies often criticize Russia alone for publishing propaganda and fake news, Facebook, Stanford University and others revealed in 2020 that social platforms such as Facebook and others are used as battlefields between French and Russian power networks in foreign countries including Niger, Burkina Faso, Algeria, Chad, Ivory Coast, Madagascar, Equatorial Guinea, Mozambique, and South Africa, as well as the African diaspora in France.²²

(19) HakimAlladi Najmuddin, "The French Role in Africa and its Implications in Counterterrorism Efforts." Mashhad Magazine, 2021, pp. 62-69.

(20) "Preparing for Rain: Emerging Competition between France and Russia in Africa", Adastra, 24/12/2021: bit.ly/3jBwy2K.

(21) Najmuddin. «ECOWAS Sanctions», op. cit.

(22) Quentin Velluet. «France/Russia: Propaganda war on Facebook targets Mali & the car». The Africa Report, 21/12/2020: bit.ly/3M0HIPX



According to the Facebook report, there are attempts by accounts linked to the owner of Wagner, Evgeny Bregoine, and networks linked to the French army to discredit each other and their programs through comments, posts, tweets, and online campaigns. On the French side, the focus was on French military operations and initiatives in the French-speaking Sahel and Africa, and talking about possible Russian interference in the elections in the Central African Republic. On the Russian side, the focus was on criticism of French foreign policy, with talk of an attempted coup d'état in Equatorial Guinea through letters and publications in French, English, Portuguese and Arabic, as well as the promotion of a Russian vaccine, as well as talk of Moscow's policy in sub-Saharan Africa.²³

4- African actors

The African factors of civil society organizations resisting foreign presence on the continent's territory cannot be ignored, as although the common view in the continent at present is to reject French presence, countries such as the Central African Republic and others have witnessed resistance against Russian-backed governments and criticism rejecting Russian intervention in national issues.

In some African circles, Russia, like France or others, is seen as pursuing its own interests without regard for citizens' living conditions. It is also well known that public opinion in countries where Russia enjoys popular support may change negatively in the near future if there is no change in the economies and development of these countries, compared to the situation before Russia's arrival.

In addition to all that, Russia faces a series of accusations and criticisms by civil movements, regional organizations and pro-democracy groups in Africa; as Moscow is accused of impeding democratic progress and undermining the achievements of some countries in the field of civil governance. Some of these groups, which espouse Western norms of government, are likely to cooperate with Western organizations to deter Russian influence.

(23) Ibid .



Finally, the main sources of revenue for Russian exports to Africa are unstable, because of the fragility of the partnership and relationship with African countries. Those exports consist of combatants and arms, while disinformation is disseminated to promote their agendas and programs with their African allies. All indications show that, in the near future, Russia's friends may return to their Western allies if bilateral relations improve again, which means that Russia is considered a partner of last resort, which can be turned to in times of crisis or in an attempt to avoid Western obstacles and European constraints, or to overcome regulatory requirements for human rights.



Third: The "Russian-Ukrainian" crisis in the African context

African views differ on the "Russian-Ukrainian" war, with some believing that it will contribute to building a new world order that will benefit Africa and help it counteract the economic factors and influences of colonialism.

In this context, a reading of the general atmosphere shows that most African governments are lining up behind Russia, as although African countries have criticized Moscow in various statements, most other countries have remained silent. In South Africa, the most prominent members of the ruling African National Congress (ANC) party support Russia, as President Cyril Ramaphosa blamed NATO for the war, and former South African President Jacob Zuma issued a statement supporting Russia and criticizing the West.

At the emergency meeting of the United Nations General Assembly last February, in which States voted for a resolution condemning Moscow's conduct as an illegal act of aggression in violation of Article 2, paragraph 4, of the Charter of the United Nations, and Russia demanded the complete and unconditional withdrawal of all its military forces from the territory of Ukraine within its internationally recognized borders, 27 African States voted in favor of the resolution (including Gabon, Ghana, Kenya and Nigeria) out of 141 States that voted as well, while 17 African States abstained from voting out of 35 States that also abstained. Abstaining States included Algeria, Angola, Burundi, the Central African Republic, the Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Madagascar, Mali, Mozambique, Namibia, Senegal, South Africa, South Sudan, the Sudan, Uganda, Tanzania and Zimbabwe. Eritrea was the only African State to vote against the resolution, out of five, including, of course, Russia.²⁴

⁽²⁴⁾ "UN resolution against Ukraine invasion: full text", Al Jazeera, 03/03/2022: bit.ly/37gJnV



From the details of the vote, it can be said that African countries voted according to the strength and weakness of their relations with Russia, and according to their foreign policy directions, democratic principles, and relations with Western countries. The outcome of the African vote elicited criticism from the citizens of some governments that voted against Russia, while social forces in others praised the positions of their governments.

There are Africans who, on the basis of the continent's past experiences in the West's conflicts with the Soviet Union, have demanded that its leaders remain neutral and not align with Ukraine or Russia.

Reports of racist and inhuman treatment by Ukrainian and Polish forces against Africans and other people fleeing the war have inflamed African public opinion against Ukraine and the West, and strengthened Russia's position within Africa.

Racist analyses by European news organizations and commentators, as well as commentaries, view States²⁵ such as Somalia and Syria as hotbeds of war and conflict while Ukraine is a land of warless civilization, and other statements by personalities in States considered to be traditional allies of Africa, such as the United Kingdom, France,²⁶ and other European States, have all impeded, and continue to impede, Ukraine's efforts to attract African support.

News networks, commentators, and European personalities that make such statements have been shown to be unfamiliar with or ignoring the history of Europe as one of the most prominent areas of conflict and war at the global level, where the two world wars took place, and have witnessed many conflicts in the past decades, including another Russian invasion of Crimea in 2014.²⁷

(25) 'Double standards': Western coverage of Ukraine war criticized", Al Jazeera, 27/02/2022: bit.ly/379gWRr.

(26) Oliver Browning. "Prince William sparks backlash after calling bloodshed in Ukraine 'alien to Europe'", Independent, 2021: bit.ly/3JGPPtY

(27) "Russia-Ukraine crisis: 9 milestone moments in history that explain today's invasion", History Extra, 24/02/2022: bit.ly/3roFe0r



Dealing with the ongoing Ukrainian crisis is in line with what some Africans consider "international hypocrisy" and "European double standards" in dealing with Africa, which emerged, for example, when the continent tried to help itself overcome its challenges in this regard, such as the "Covid19-" crisis, where African leaders during the pandemic in 2020 and 2021 asked vaccine companies to raise intellectual property in order for Africa to make its vaccines to combat the spread of the epidemic. But Western countries not only collected internationally available vaccines, but also ignored African demand, until China came with its vaccine and later Russia. This issue of COVID19-vaccines has been among the reasons why African leaders resent the European Union.²⁸

(28) Hakeem Aladi Najmuddin, "EU and Africa: Resetting core relationships or renewing approaches?", Al-Jazeera Studies Center, 16/02/2022: studies.aljazeera.net/en/article/5287

Conclusion

Extrapolating Russia's presence on the African continent and reading the challenges facing Moscow in the context of political and security events at the international level and in sub-Saharan Africa, it is concluded that Russia is likely to continue its current policy on the continent due to the lack of political and economic factors against its existence.

But it seems that the Russian presence could be a double-edged sword, depending on how African leaders exploit it. It could be a substitute for the investments of traditional allies and a catalyst for practical solutions to existing security challenges, and, conversely, it could cause reprisals in States where Moscow lures politicians without checks and balances, which could lead to conflicts, entrench corruption of rulers and exploit public funds without subjecting leaders to legal accountability.

One of the outcomes of the study is that Russia's renewed interest in the African continent may return the conflicts of international geopolitical forces to it, as traditional allies of Africa may try to hinder Russia's efforts while Moscow reciprocates.

Russia's presence forces the EU and traditional allies to recalculate and reveal new strategies toward the continent, providing an opportunity for African countries to benefit from rivalry. Finally, Russia's success in Africa depends on its success in dealing with France, the United States of America, China, and other traditional allies.



Dimensions

for Strategic Studies

-  \DimensionsCTR
-  \DimensionsCTR
-  \dimensionscenter
-  \dimensionscenter

info@dimensionscenter.net