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Studies



# European Union after the invasion of Ukraine: transformations and pathways

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## **Dimensions** for Strategic Studies

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# Preamble

Since its establishment, the European Union has gone through a number of crises, including in the last two decades the war on terrorism and the financial crisis of 2009, and refugee issues after the political transformations in the Arab region and Eastern Europe, leading to the outbreak of the Corona epidemic and then Brexit.

Those and other events posed real challenges to the European Union, which was able to address them in one way or another, to strengthen its resilience and gradually strengthen its policies, and thus the tests were necessary to fill any void in those policies, be they economic, financial, security, legal or otherwise.

However, those crises and challenges, although sometimes serious and fragmented, had not departed from the traditional framework of the history of States and blocs, and were normal, if compared to what had been caused by the Russian invasion of Ukraine. The war initiated by Moscow on 24 February 2022 presented the European Union with unprecedented challenges, which Member States have tried to deal with seriously and firmly.

As Russia had just invaded Ukraine, the EU came to grips with the shock, and then tried to respond from far and wide. The response began with a declaration of absolute solidarity with Ukraine, with all what is possible. At the very least, it's enough to lift a Ukrainian passport on a French train, so the controller would understand that you're exempt. At most, the EU seemed to want to raise a red card in Russia's face and in the face of an imperial dream in the mind of its ruler.

However, the red card, which was thought to be lifted quickly (hours after the war broke out) appeared to gradually have many obstacles before it. Such obstacles were created by decades of European policies that were unprepared for a day of disengagement from Moscow starting with energy policies, up to Member States' divergent policies towards the relationship with the Soviet East first and later with the Russian Federation. Between energy and contrasts among member states, many thorny files, the EU has found itself mired in, ever since the Ukrainian battle began to unfold.

In all cases, the war had implications for the European position, and indeed on the EU, in general. These effects have gradually manifested themselves at many levels.

In an effort to understand these effects, and given that the crisis is manifold, the fundamental issues that have surfaced as a result of the war on Ukraine must be addressed. These issues are centred first on military strategy, second on energy policies, and third on relations with Washington; all of which will determine the EU's future.

## First: Military strategy

The Russian invasion of Ukraine on 24 February did not come from a vacuum, but rather after nearly eight years of tension caused by Russia's annexation of Crimea (South) on 18 March 2014, the largest annexation of territory since World War II. Crimean annexation had been considered a violation of the Helsinki Convention, which provided for the peaceful settlement of disputes, respect for the sovereignty of all States and the guarantee of the rights of individuals. Furthermore, it stipulates that international borders cannot be changed in Europe. In addition to the annexation of Crimea, there was a bloody conflict in the Donbas region (north-east) in which around 14,000 people were killed between 2014 and 2020<sup>(1)</sup>.

The European position has been weak for eight years after the annexation of Crimea, and here comes the characterization of weakness compared to the challenges posed by that annexation, and to the possibility of events developing into a greater Russian expansion. True, the EU began imposing sanctions on Russia after it declared its annexation of Crimea<sup>(2)</sup>, but those sanctions and the measures taken would not have expressed actual European discontent with Moscow's behaviour, and relations between the countries of the Union and Moscow remained semi-normal. The European actions, that could be described as normal, continued. They were not up to making Moscow think much before invading Ukraine in 2022.

The European position remained weak throughout those years leading up to the invasion of Ukraine. Although the countries of the Union expected the Russian invasion of Ukrainian territory- albeit in varying proportions that appeared in the statements of various countries' officials - this invasion shocked the corridors of decision- making in the European Union. In the early hours of the Russian bombing, it was clear that the Union is facing a major unexperienced before development, as its eastern borders were subject to stability imposed by interests, partnerships and political and economic balances, even in most years of the cold war.

(1) Steven Pifer, Crimea: «Six years after illegal annexation», Brookings, 2020/03/17: [brook.gs/3VWAzjy](https://brook.gs/3VWAzjy)

(2) On 6 March 2014, days before the announcement of the annexation, an extraordinary meeting of EU Heads of State and Government was held, at which leaders condemned Russia's actions in Ukraine and decided to begin preparations for individual restrictive measures (asset freeze and travel ban). On 20 March 2014, following Russia's announcement of Crimea annexation, the European Union imposed additional sanctions on 12 Russian and Crimean officials and cancelled a summit between the European Union and Russia. The European Union has been periodically extending those sanctions.

Regardless of the political, legal and historical arguments that emerged on both sides of the conflict, namely Russia on the one hand and Ukraine and the European Union on the other, the countries of the Union found themselves, even those countries that had always shared interests with Moscow, in a position that did not allow them to remain silent or hesitate, so it was inevitable that a violent political response would be accompanied by a military response, through the support of the Kiev government in repelling the Russian forces, otherwise the Union would appear in a weak position, even a failed one.

EU policymakers, of course, knew that Ukraine's support against Russia was aimed not only at protecting the Union's eastern borders, but also at protecting the continent from the major effects of war, at various levels. Thus, the European Union has taken the path of military support, recording an unprecedented development in its history by participating in the war through declared support of military equipment and lethal weapons. Such a strategic change is likely due to two reasons: The first reason is that the European Union is highly unlikely to bring "NATO" to defend Ukraine, because the latter is not a member of NATO, and because the Alliance is at the core of the crisis, due to the Russian rejection of its expansion to its borders. Therefore, its participation might drag the world into a wide and destructive war. The second reason, which has become certain, is that the European Union is in the process of changing its military strategy, which has always focused on the idea of defending the continent by "NATO".

## European Peace Facility

A few hours after the war began, the European Union began a military movement under the European Peace Facility, announcing that it would give Kiev lethal weapons, marking the first time the Union had given such weapons<sup>(3)</sup>.

It should be recalled that European Union established the European Peace Facility on 22 March 2021, with funding of 5,6\$ billion until 2027<sup>(4)</sup>.

(3) Calin Trenkov-Wermuth, Jacob Zack, "Ukraine: The EU's Unpiece Provision of Lethal Aid is a Good First Step", 2022/10/27: <https://bit.ly/3VTsqwo>

(4) European Peace Facility, European Council of the European Union: <https://bit.ly/3j34hVt>

The Facility aims at strengthening the Union's capacity to avoid conflicts, build peace and strengthen international security by allowing for the financing of operations under the Common Foreign and Security Policy that have military or defence dimensions. It has replaced previous financing instruments in this area, namely the African Peace Facility and the Athens Mechanism<sup>(5)</sup>.

In an effort to strengthen its military power, increase national investment in defence research and improve interoperability among national armed forces; especially its aim of strategic independence from American protection, the Union established in 2017 a defence fund of 15\$ billion. This funding; however, lost about a third of the amount in 2020, with the Union having to allocate part of it to confront the Corona epidemic<sup>(6)</sup>.

Since the establishment of the European Peace Facility, the Union has provided assistance to several countries, including medical equipment, support for military infrastructure, and cyber defence. With Russia's invasion of Ukraine; however, the EU revised its policy on the type of support, turning %90 of its support for Kiev through the facility into lethal weapons<sup>(7)</sup>.

It is worth mentioning that, as the war continued and its events developed, the European Union was increasing Ukraine's arms support through the Peace Facility. For example, on 13 April 2022, the Union announced that it had adopted two assistance measures under the annex that would allow for "further support for the capabilities of the Ukrainian armed forces to defend the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the country, and to protect the civilian population against the existing Russian military aggression".

According to a note issued in Brussels at the time, "the EU will add 500 million euros to the resources already allocated under the EPF for Ukraine, thus tripling the initial budget to 1,5 billion euros." The memorandum noted that these resources "will finance the provision of equipment and supplies to the Ukrainian armed forces by EU member states, including personal protective equipment, first aid kits and fuel, as well as lethal military equipment for defensive purposes<sup>(8)</sup>."

(5) Athena - financing security and defence military operations, European Council of the European Union: <https://bit.ly/2QGSCYB>

(6) Rob Shmitz, "Facing Trump Pressure, EU Invested More In Own Defense. Will It Continue With Biden?", 2020/11/18: <https://n.pr/3BKXSVz>

(7) Calin Trenkov-Wermuth, Jacob Zack, "Ukraine: The EU's Unpiece Provision of Lethal Aid is a Good First Step", 2022/10/27: <https://bit.ly/3VTsqwo>

(8) «European Union: 500 million additional euros to supply Ukraine with weapons and equipment», Italian Aki News Agency, 2022/04/13: <https://bit.ly/3jeZ4u5>

On 21 July, the EU increased its support to the Ukrainian armed forces to 2,5 billion euros<sup>(9)</sup>, and on 17 October to 3,1 billion euros<sup>(10)</sup>. Thus, the European Union's response has been escalating as the war continues and its events evolve.

## Military assistance mission

In addition to the Euro3,1 billion European Peace Facility, on 15 November, the Union launched what it called the European Union Military Assistance Mission to Ukraine (EUMAM Ukraine), which had been established on 17 October, with the aim of strengthening the military capacity of the Ukrainian armed forces to defend the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Ukraine within its internationally recognized borders, as well as to protect the civilian population<sup>(11)</sup>.

European Union foreign policy representative Josip Borrell stated that EUFOR must provide training for 15,000 military personnel, noting that it was limited to 24 months, and an amount of Euro106,7 million should be allocated to meet all its needs. It pointed out that the Mission included unprecedented support for the Ukrainian armed forces, including equipment for arming and training Ukrainian forces<sup>(12)</sup>.

The EU bases for the training of the armed forces of Ukraine are supposed to be on the territory of Germany and Poland, while the possibility of involving other States in the training of combat troops is being considered. This mission provides individual, group and specialized training to the Ukrainian armed forces<sup>(13)</sup>.

"Russia Today" website, commenting on the European military mission, said that "the danger is that coordinating the efforts of individual EU countries will ensure that the Ukrainian army is trained to conduct military operations against Russia on a bilateral basis<sup>(14)</sup>."

(9) European Peace Facility: EU support to Ukraine increased to 2,5€ billion, European Union, 2022/07/22: <https://bit.ly/3YB4lfM>

(10) «Ukraine: Council agreements on further support under the European Peace Facility», European Council of the European Union, 2022/10/17: <https://bit.ly/3PjSCxG>

(11) Ukraine: EU launches Military Assistance Mission, European Council, 2022/11/15: <https://bit.ly/3W8Q34i>

(12) European Union Assistance Mission Ukraine (EUMAM), The Diplomatic Service of the European Union 2022/12/02: <https://bit.ly/3v1vsCQ>

(13) Ukraine: EU sets up a military assistance mission to further support the Ukrainian Armed Forces, European Council of the European Union, 2022/10/17: <https://bit.ly/3BwMiNL>

(14) "They can carry out joint operations against Russia. The European Union trains 15,000 Ukrainians, 'Russia Today', 2022/11/13: <https://bit.ly/3YaV4Lb>

While the funding allocated to FDA (106,7 million euros) is small compared to the amount spent during the war in Ukraine, it has become clear that the European Union starts from initial or operational amounts and then increases these amounts according to developments.

Together with the European Peace Facility and the European Union Military Assistance Mission for Ukraine, which are working in particular on military matters, the Union has, since the beginning of the Russian invasion, provided substantial financial support to Kiev for financial and humanitarian assistance.

By November 2022, EU member states' total military, financial, and humanitarian assistance amounted to 52€ billion, with Germany being Europe's largest donor, and by the same date, US assistance amounted to 48€ billion<sup>(15)</sup>. The significant rise in the European figure is the result of the 18€ billion that the EU agreed to grant Ukraine in 2023 in the form of loans<sup>(16)</sup>.

European assistance to Ukraine; however, raises questions about the individual amounts provided by European countries, which point to their different positions, their future policies toward the crisis, and even the EU itself.

Investigating deeply the individual European figures away from the overall European figure allows political and perhaps future indicators to emerge. As of October 3, military assistance amounted to 27,4\$ billion from the United States, 3,71\$ billion from the United Kingdom, 1,8\$ billion from Poland, 1,19\$ billion from Germany, 0,92\$ billion from Canada, and 0,32\$ billion from Norway<sup>(17)</sup>.

Parallel to the EU's support for Ukraine in its war against Russia, a number of EU member states have begun to witness a strategic shift in the subject of investment in the armament and defence sector, which is in line with European trends that have emerged with the start of US President Donald Trump's term in 2016, but its pace has slowed down with the world's entry into the Corona pandemic in 2020. Perhaps the most notable example of a strategic military transformation, following the Russian invasion of Ukraine, is Germany, which, first, since the end of World War II, has preferred a peaceful approach away from the arms race, despite its great industrial and technological superiority, and second, has pursued a policy of cooperation with Moscow through commercial and economic interests, the most prominent manifestation of which is the Nord Stream pipeline to which natural gas is transported from Russia.

<sup>(15)</sup> Ukraine Support Tracker, Kiel Institute for the World Economy, <https://bit.ly/3uH5yUP>

<sup>(16)</sup> «Council adopts 18€ billion assistance to Ukraine», European Council, 2022/12/10: <https://bit.ly/3BJuBus>

<sup>(17)</sup> Katharina Buchholz, „Where Military Aid to Ukraine Comes From, 2022/11/10: <https://bit.ly/3BKm2iW>



German Chancellor Olaf Schultz announced on 27 February 2022, three days after the Russian invasion of Ukraine, a plan to strengthen the German defence military by investing 100 billion euros, while confirming that his country would commit to allocating 2 percent of its total internal production to defence annually<sup>(18)</sup>, which was agreed upon in NATO in 2006.

The new procedure supports the German defence budget of about 50 billion euros per year, allowing the rebuilding of the German military force, which suffered from years of neglect following the end of the cold war, although previous statements and reports have pointed out that the German army is in a bad situation, which hampers its ability and readiness to fight.

It should be noted that at the EU summit in Versailles last March, French President Emmanuel Macron urged Union countries to allocate %2 of their budget to defence<sup>(19)</sup>.

## Variations in 'Defence'

The disparities between the European Union countries is not limited to the figures of aid, which may be due to the position and circumstances of each country, nor to the political stand, but also to what is deeper; especially the popular attitudes towards war and its effects. Such positions have divided the European Union into two major camps: the peace camp and the justice camp; where the first wants to stop the war for peace at the expense of Ukraine, while the second is keen on holding Russia accountable, even if the war lasts long.

The European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR) conducted a survey in ten countries last May<sup>(20)</sup>, when the European peoples at the time absorbed the trauma of war and understood its effects. In this survey, and in response to a question that says: Should your country strengthen defence spending now, %53 in the justice camp answered that military spending should be increased, albeit by mitigating spending on sectors such as health, education and crime prevention. In this camp, %29 answered that defence spending should not be raised, despite the war; this would require a reduction in spending in other sectors.

(18) Germany commits 100€ billion to defence spending, DW, 2022/02/27: <https://bit.ly/3hAFoAg>

(19) Speech by President Emmanuel Macron - Press conference at the Versailles Summit, French Presidency of the Council of the European Union, 2022/03/11: <https://bit.ly/3W8Q34i>

(20) Ivan Krastev, Mark Leonard, Peace versus Justice: The coming European split over the war in Ukraine, 2022/06/15: <https://bit.ly/3hFY5IZ>

In detail, %52 of Poles answered that military spending should be increased, even at the expense of other sectors, while %21 refused that. Sweden came after Poland along the same lines with %50 and %20. Germany followed suit by %41 and %32, and Finland by %36 and %26. The pattern was changed with France, where %31 answered the need to increase spending at the expense of other sectors, while %39 rejected the issue. Then came Britain with %25 and %36. And finally, Italy with %14 in favour of increasing defence spending and %63 rejected the matter.

This poll firstly reflected the popular positions of a number of European countries, most of which are in line with the positions of power in each country, and secondly showed the disparities between those countries, which sometimes amount to a separation in determining the policies that must be followed towards the war on Ukraine. This disparity may affect the depth of the idea of the European Union itself. It, furthermore, gave an idea about the future of policies in each country, as popular views will be reflected in the composition of power.

The survey found that %35 of those asked stand in the peace camp, %22 stand in the justice camp, and %20 are hesitant. The rest, %23, gave varied and different answers. In this context, Italy ranked first in favour of the peace camp by %52 compared to %16 for the justice camp, followed by Germany %49 compared to %19, France %41 and %23, Britain %22 for the peace camp and %21 for the justice camp, and Poland %16 for the peace camp and %41 for the justice camp.

## Second: Energy policies

The second evident heading in the European scene, after the priority of supporting Ukraine militarily against the Russian invasion, was to deal with the energy crisis, as fears rose with the beginning of the invasion, due to the repercussions of the war on energy prices. There was great concern about the energy sources of the European Union, because %40 of that came from Russia<sup>(21)</sup>.

Indeed, those fears quickly turned into reality, first because supplies were affected by the realities of the war on the ground, second because the EU had to reduce reliance on Russian gas as a form of punishment to Russia, and of course to work on alternatives; and third because of Russian actions to pressure Europeans through gas, such as reducing supplies and then demanding payment in Russian roubles, after the 27 EU countries adopted unprecedented financial and economic sanctions that led to its devaluation, before regaining its status later<sup>(22)</sup>.

Thus, after the Russian invasion, energy prices, which had originally risen in 2021, rose after the return to normalcy following the historical paralysis caused by the coronavirus pandemic. For example, electricity prices in the European Union rose %35 year on year<sup>(23)</sup>.

Amid all these developments, the EU had to look for solutions and for alternatives, because even if it wanted to overlook the energy issue in the sanctions on Moscow, i.e. no sanctions on Russian energy supplies, the Kremlin used energy supplies as leverage.

(21) Before the war, Russia supplied %40 of Europe's natural gas, mostly via pipelines. Gas flows through Ukraine to Austria, Italy, Slovakia and other countries in Europe. According to Gazprom's data, nine gas lines exit Russia. The lines included the Nord Stream 2 line, which was completed and suspended by Germany after the Ukraine war, as well as a line to China.

(22) On 24 February 2022, the start of the war, the European Union introduced a number of sanctions targeting Russia's financial sector, energy, transport and dual-use goods, as well as visa policy. On 25 February, the European Union approved another set of individual and economic sanctions in response to the Russian invasion, covering the finance, energy, transport and technology sectors. On 28 February, the Federation adopted new measures, including a ban on transactions with the Central Bank of Russia, and on 2 March, it removed seven Russian banks from the swift system, which means that they have separated from the international financial system.

(23) Infographic-Energy crisis: Three EU-coordinated measures to cut down bills, European Council: <https://bit.ly/3Yx4QqQ>

But the most striking fact that has emerged since the beginning of the Russian invasion of Ukraine is that the European Union, despite eight years of tension with Moscow after its annexation of Crimea in 2014, did not expect that there would come a day when it had to deal with a major energy problem against the backdrop of a crisis with Russia, knowing that Moscow continued to provide Europe with energy sources, during the Cold War and various crises. In other words, the EU was not seriously prepared for such a matter, either because it did not anticipate that the large-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine would take place, or simply because it had no options to have a plan B, or all were tough options. In both cases, the result was that only after the invasion of Ukraine did serious and pragmatic discussions begin to search for alternatives to Russian gas.

Since the Russian invasion of 24 February, European meetings have taken place at several levels, most notably at the level of heads of states and at the level of ministers. One of the most important of these meetings was the meeting of European leaders in Versailles on 10 and 11 March 2022, where they came up with results called the "Versailles Declaration", which stipulated one of its most important provisions to stop dependence on Russian gas as soon as possible<sup>(24)</sup>, by developing new sources of energy in Europe and accelerating the reduction of dependence on fossil fuels, taking into account the data of the member countries of the Union and their options regarding energy sources.

At the time, French President Emmanuel Macron told reporters: "If (Russian President Vladimir) Putin intensifies the bombing and imposes a siege on Kiev, and if he escalates the scenes of war, we will have to impose additional harsh penalties." Macron did not rule out that the EU would also target gas or oil imports that had until that day been exempt from sanctions because of the high cost to Europeans if they stopped importing them, and said, "Nothing is not allowed, nothing is forbidden." We are prepared to impose heavier penalties<sup>(25)</sup>."

The atmosphere of the Versailles meeting, and the declaration issued at its conclusion, looked tough on Moscow, as if it were the beginning of a major transformation of the European Union, which has long depended on Russia for a large part of its energy imports. After that meeting, the European atmosphere continued to inspire rigidity on the subject of energy, but without a real decision to break with Russia on gas, Europe was never ready for that.

(24) Versailles Declaration, Informal meeting of the Heads of State or Government, 2022/03/11: <https://bit.ly/3Wcjcvz>

(25) «Versailles Summit: The European Union proposes to double Ukraine's military funding to counter the Russian attack», France 2022/03/11, 24: <https://bit.ly/3PwA7Gq>

But Russia's continuation of military operations has pushed the EU to raise its stiffness against the Kremlin, given that some of the Union's countries have been seeking to ensure that the US position is not stronger in defending Ukraine and punishing Russia for its invasion.

Amid this atmosphere, the European Union, during a summit in Brussels on 30 May, agreed to ban 90% of Russian gas by the end of 2022, with the temporary exception of crude oil that comes through pipelines<sup>(26)</sup>.

European Council President Charles Michel said: The leaders of the European Union agreed during the summit to impose a gradual ban on oil imports that Russia exports by ship, which constitutes two-thirds of the oil imported from Russia; while at the same time they agreed to grant a temporary exemption for oil transported through pipelines. This is to appease Hungary, which threatened to veto this package of European sanctions against Russia<sup>(27)</sup>. Berlin and Warsaw pledged to stop their imports of Russian oil through the Dragba pipeline, raising to 90% the amount of Russian oil exports that will be abandoned by the European Union by the end of the year, according to European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen.

But most of the European statements that followed the decision to give up 90% of Russian oil exports focused on it as a punishment for Moscow, and in order to hit the financial liquidity it earns from oil, rather than on it as a trend of independence from Russia on the oil issue.

The President of the European Council said: "This reduction will deprive the (Russian) war machine of a huge source of funding and" will exert maximum pressure "on Moscow to stop its war on its neighbour, while the European Union's High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Joseph Burrell, said: "It is an important decision to paralyze Putin's war machine. "Our unity is our strength<sup>(28)</sup>"

According to the Jacques Delors Institute, by December, Russia had earned 67 billion euros from its oil sales to the European Union since the beginning of the war in Ukraine, while its annual military budget was about 60 billion euros<sup>(29)</sup>.

(26) Impact of Russia's invasion of Ukraine on the markets: EU response, European Council: <https://bit.ly/3FwnZjY>

(27) «The European Union decides to reduce its imports of Russian oil by 90 percent», France 2022/05/31, 24: <https://bit.ly/3WiZDKF>

(28) Jennifer Rankin, "EU leaders agree to partial embargo of Russian oil imports", The Guardian, 2022/05/31: <https://bit.ly/3HA0RDU>

(29) «The European Union sets a maximum price per barrel of Russian oil», Al-Hurra, 2022/12/02 <https://arbne.ws/3uTOefr>

However, in parallel with seeking to punish Russia or trying to paralyse its military machine by cutting off its energy income, there were voices in the European Union for a serious search for alternatives to Russian energy, in other words, for the further implementation of the Versailles Declaration of March with regard to ending de facto energy dependence on Russia.

In this context, and in order to accelerate the end of dependence on Russian fossil fuels, through a plan called “REPowerEU”, the European Council called, at the conclusion of a meeting held on May 31-30, to further diversify sources of energy supplies and accelerate the adoption of energy sources. It also called for renewable energy, further improving energy efficiency, and improving the interconnection of gas and electricity networks<sup>(30)</sup>.

However, as the decision of the Versailles meeting regarding fossil fuels, those decisions were accompanied by the phrase "taking into account the conditions, circumstances and different sources of energy" of each member state of the Union. No decisive decisions had therefore been taken, and flexibility was needed to safeguard the interests of some Member States that depended on Russia for a large part of their energy resources.

Naturally, more than three months after the war began, the European Union began to take those decisions regardless of the fate of the war. Even if that war were to end before the end of 2022, the Union could not retreat from it, and thus through those resolutions it sought to make strategic shifts in the subject of energy.

On the other hand, Moscow tried to initiate pressure on Europe. In June, it reduced supplies through the pipeline to %40 of the total capacity, then to %20 in July. It also cut off supplies to several countries such as Bulgaria, Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands and Poland<sup>(31)</sup>.

That Russian response, through a reduction in supply, appears to have prompted the European Union to proceed with measures to free it from Moscow in the area of energy, calling on 20 October 2022 for the adoption of new measures, including the voluntary joint purchase of gas by member States<sup>(32)</sup>, and adopting interim measures to cap the price of gas for electricity generation.

(30) Special meeting of the European Council, 31-30 May 2022, European Council: <https://bit.ly/3uXOrOO>

(31) «A New Stop to Russian Gas Stifles Energy in Europe», Al-Jazeera Net, 2022/08/31: <https://bit.ly/3V9nMch>

(32) European Council conclusions on energy and economy, 20 October 2022, European Council, 2022/10/21: <https://bit.ly/3WnNn2g>

In successive meetings, the EU agreed on measures to reduce energy bills<sup>(33)</sup>, including voluntary measures to reduce electricity consumption by %10 by March 2023, as well as compulsory measures for EU countries to reduce electricity consumption by %5 at peak hours.

The European Union considered that the expected result of those actions was the maintenance of the fuel stock for electricity generation, as well as the positive impact on prices in terms of the more expensive hours of electricity consumption. The new rules would also allow the countries of the Union to extend temporarily the reduced prices of homes and small and medium-sized businesses.

On the other hand, the EU has worked on a new measure that will allow for a ceiling on market profits, which aims to curb producers' profits and thus benefit homes and businesses, as energy producers who do not use gas to generate electricity have unexpectedly made significant financial gains in recent months, benefiting from higher electricity prices and stable operating costs.

In a related context, and given that fossil fuel companies have made additional profits from high energy prices, the EU has worked to ensure that these companies contribute to helping people and businesses struggling to pay energy bills, and ensure that contribution comes from the profits of companies that have risen more than %20 compared to the profit rate over the last four years.

The European Union has pursued this trend, which seems to balance strategic energy transformation and a move away from Russia with curbing Russia's energy profits, punishing it, and hitting its military financial capacity.

On 2 December, after a long time of give and take, the European Union announced a ceiling on Russian oil prices of 60\$ per barrel transported by sea, despite differences in views among member States on this price<sup>(34)</sup>. The Group of Seven (G7-) States and Australia have agreed on the same principle. The US Treasury said that setting a ceiling on the price of Russian oil achieves the goal of restricting Putin's main source of income<sup>(35)</sup>. Kiev supported the decision, saying it would “destroy Russia's economy.” However, it considered that “the price cap should have been lowered to 30\$ to destroy the Russian economy faster.”

(33) Infographic-Energy crisis: Three EU-coordinated measures to cut down bills, European Council: <https://bit.ly/3Yx4QqQ>

(34) Poland, the last country to approve the decision, gave the green light to the Union, after it had pressed for a lower price.

(35) «Group of Seven and Australia agree on a ceiling for the price of Russian oil of 60\$», Arabic Net, 2022/12/3: <https://bit.ly/3HF76X4>

In response to these measures, Putin said that his country will increase gas supplies to the East, especially to China, noting that the price will be determined for Europe in the coming months through an electronic platform<sup>(36)</sup>.

It should be noted that the price of Russian oil (crude from the Urals) is currently about 65\$ per barrel, slightly above the European ceiling, so there are doubts about the impact of the European decision on Russia.

Following Russia's reduction of gas pumping to European countries, Russian gas exports to China, via the Siberian line that reaches the east of the country, have risen significantly. Since last July, Russian gas exports to China have increased by about %300 compared to the average in previous years<sup>(37)</sup>.

In sum, the EU seemed to be taking a gradual approach in the issue of energy, through actions whose upward line was based first on the absence of ready-made energy plans, and secondly throughout the war and the continuation of the crisis. However, as the end of the year approaches, there are no clear and detailed figures on the reality of the European Union regarding energy supplies from Russia, which come in different ways, specifically the reality of each country in this context. It is also unclear how far the various countries of the Union have come in implementing plans to search for alternatives to Russian gas, and on the subject of renewable energy.

But an important factor that may have allowed the EU to take decisions incrementally, and sometimes hesitate, by postponing crucial decisions, is that its major countries have stockpiled gas in the past months.

According to AGSI, which specializes in tracking the world's gas inventory, France, Germany and Italy have reached a reassuring level of storage, unlike the Eastern European countries, which suffer from a severe shortage of gas storage. The gas storage ratios in some European countries before the start of the cold season this year were as follows: Germany: %84, France: %91, Belgium: %88,5, Denmark: %88, Italy: %82, Poland: %99, Bulgaria: %66, Hungary: %63, Latvia: %53<sup>(38)</sup>.

(36) «Putin plans more gas sales to China, e-platform for European prices», Reuters, 2022/12/15: <https://reut.rs/3PylQZV>

(37) Ayoub Al-Raimi, how will European countries live after the Russian gas cut? Al Jazeera Net, 2022/09/2: <https://bit.ly/3UV7mEs>

(38) “How will European countries survive Russian gas cuts?”, op. cit.



It is noteworthy that the International Energy Agency developed a scenario showing that Russian gas flows to Europe will decline a lot in 2025, then to zero in 2028, by relying on liquefied gas and clean renewable energy, while the agency expected that the rupture in gas trade between Russia and Europe would be permanent<sup>(39)</sup>.

The President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, spoke on 12 December 2022, in what resembles an inventory of what the European Union has done on energy since the beginning of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, and of what is planned for the future<sup>(40)</sup>.

By September 2022, Russia had cut %80 of power supply through pipelines, compared to September 2021, which put a great strain on the European energy system, von der Leyen said. She stressed, however, that the EU was able to face the matter, saying, “We were able to face blackmail.”

The European official used the word "blackmail" to describe Russia cutting off energy supplies from Europe, at a time when the European Union says it wants to dispense with these Russian supplies and be completely independent of Moscow on the subject of energy. The characterisation by the European official thus raises questions about what the Union really wants.

Speaking about European actions, von der Leyen said that seven months ago the EU launched the “REPOWEREU” plan, which aims to reduce demand for Russian gas by two-thirds by the end of the year. 300 billion Euros had been allocated to that plan, which, according to the European official, had been transformed into numerous bills and executive acts on the ground.

The President of the European Commission talked about 10 steps taken by the European Union over a period of 10 months, including:

- A significant move away from Russian fossil fuels and from Russian gas imports towards reliable and trustworthy suppliers.
- Work on expanding renewable sources of energy. The European Union has added about 50 gigawatts of this energy, doubling it, especially those that utilise wind and the sun. This is important not only as clean energy, but also because it creates autonomy and security of supply.

(39) Javier Blas, “Can Europe's Energy Bridge to Russia Ever Be Rebuilt?”, 2022/12/12: <https://bloom.bg/3j3r3N2>

(40) Statement by President von der Leyen on ‘RepowerEU: outlook on EU gas supply in 2023’, European Commission, 2022/12/12: <https://bit.ly/3Fxs9sb>

- Solidarity among member States, where the Union will resort to the joint purchase of gas to improve negotiating and getting better prices.
- Work on improving energy infrastructure.

In the end, the European Union was able to avoid an imminent danger on the subject of energy, during months, especially through previous storage, while it banned Russian oil and put a ceiling on its price, and quickly tried to search for alternative energy sources.

But while the EU seeks to balance Moscow's punishment with its independence, and has announced a number of important measures, it is not easy to get a clear picture of the Union's current energy reality and its ability to move away from Russia as planned.

It must be noted that there is a discrepancy in the status of member states, which would exacerbate the division between the "justice camp" and the "peace camp", which allows for flexibility in decision-making by those states.

It is not known exactly what has been implemented so far and to what extent; and the impact of the actions against Russia remains unclear. All of this raises questions about the Union's success in ridding itself of Russia's need for energy.

There are even great doubts within the Union. For example, at an industry event organized by the Oxford Institute for Energy Studies in early December, participants, who are executives, policymakers, and consultants, were asked: Will the EU return to make Russia its primary gas supplier? The answers were divided between %40 who said no, and %40 who said yes; while the rest did not give an answer<sup>(41)</sup>.

Despite all the doubts; however, the European Union, which has learned its lesson, can hardly go backwards to Russia's lap in energy, unless politics carries very extraordinary things.

(41) Javier Blas, "Can Europe's Energy Bridge to Russia Ever Be Rebuilt?".

## Third: Transatlantic Relations

Not even the role of the European Union in this crisis, not even the present and the future of this regional bloc, can be said of the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the ongoing war, without talking about the main player, the United States of America. It is perhaps necessary to talk about the United States, because of several dimensions, starting from its being the strongest pole globally, an adversary and rival of Russia at the international level, and its leadership of the "North Atlantic Alliance", around which many of the backgrounds of the war in Ukraine revolve taking into consideration the reality of the "European-American" alliance that is unbalanced in many of its joints.

Washington's role on the Ukrainian subject, which is overloaded by the historically Cold War-era American arms, the "Atlantic Alliance" and political and defence alliances, has been clear since Moscow annexed Crimea in 2014. This role continued to crystallize, leading to what was considered within the framework of conspiracy theory, and even by some European and international media, to push Ukraine towards challenging Russia, thus dragging it to war. On the other hand, according to others, the invasion that began on 24 February 2022 was due to the expansionist ambitions of Russian President Vladimir Putin, who began the invasion after a huge military build-up, as his country officially recognized Donetsk and Lugansk as independent republics of Ukraine.

In any case, whatever the causes and backgrounds of the war, it has created new circumstances in the relationship on both sides of the Atlantic, specifically between the US administration and the main powers leading the European Union. These conditions have many political, military, economic and financial details, and are likely; therefore, to leave their effects on the form of the historical alliance between Europe and the United States, based on several facts, perhaps the most prominent of which - which must be addressed - is that the European Union, from the first day of the Russian invasion, began to change strategically.. How should the Union deal with the "Euro-American" alliance in the light of the Ukrainian crisis? And what approaches does it take? What is the future of the relationship between Washington and the EU?

With Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014, the confrontation with Moscow saw a transatlantic Western nexus between the US administration headed by Democrat Barack Obama and the European Union. Confrontation Moscow with Crimea; however, has slowed down, due to what may be described as a Western kind of tolerance towards the issue, given that the European Union has continued to impose sanctions on Moscow; but these have been ordinary sanctions. Naturally, this laxity increased with the world's entry into the Corona pandemic, and the repercussions it has had on all political, diplomatic, military and economic levels.

However, the American-European alliance, despite the laxity regarding Crimea, has traditionally remained strong, living in a pattern that is decades old, as Europe relies on Washington in its defence strategy as it has been since the Second World War; especially after the establishment of the "North Atlantic Alliance" in 1949, and throughout the years of the Cold War. It can be said that the European countries, which are mostly part of the "Atlantic Alliance", were of the opinion that the security of the European Union is in the hands of the Alliance, and under the umbrella of Washington since General Dwight Eisenhower defended the Allies during the Second World War.

Of course, some voices came out of the EU from time to time, calling for making the Union less dependent on Washington for security and defence. However, this matter did not appear publicly and clearly, until after the arrival of the Republican Donald Trump to the White House in 2016, when he asked his famous question: "Why should Americans defend Europeans who do not defend themselves?"

Trump, controversial in many of his policies, pointed his arrows at the European Union without any ambiguity, saying that the United States should not continue to defend Europe; and the latter should increase its military investment to defend itself<sup>(42)</sup>. He pointed out that his country would not automatically go to defend its NATO allies against a Russian attack, if they did not invest more in armaments<sup>(43)</sup>.

Of course, Trump's narrative, especially with its many "strides", needs a discussion about its accuracy and the degree to which it can really reflect the decision of American institutions, even if the US regime is a presidential regime.

(42) Doug Bandow, "Donald Trump Asks: Why Should America Defend Europeans Who Won't Defend Themselves? », Forbes, 2016/08/1: <https://bit.ly/3WtEwML>

(43) Carol Morello and Adam Taylor, "Trump says U.S. won't rush to defend NATO countries if they don't spend more on military", 2016/07/21: <https://wapo.st/3Vb88NI>

What is true, undoubtedly, is that the Europeans have always relied on the Americans in security and defence issues; first, because, they consider themselves under the umbrella of the "Atlantic Alliance", and secondly, and most importantly, they have been accustomed to this for decades; though, they have been able to possess major military powers, they still find it necessary to invest more in productive sectors than in security and defence, as the largest spending in the "Atlantic" comes from countries other than the European Union.

Trump's exaggerated statements were accompanied by a growing European awareness of dependence, and a desire that began to grow for the necessity of achieving independence in security and defence, and most importantly the parity with Washington. Thus, his "cautionary" remarks were heeded by the Europeans, who began to delve deeper into geopolitical thinking to be less dependent on Washington.

One of the results of the European "awakening" was the establishment by the European Union in 2017 of a defence fund with financing of 15 billion dollars with the aim of developing military capabilities and making the continent more independent at the strategic level, but this funding lost about a third in 2020, with the Union having to allocate part of it to confront the Corona epidemic<sup>(44)</sup>.

In the European arena, the French motions have been distinct in recent years, especially since the beginning of the Trump mandate. The aim was to push for the strengthening of the European Union force militarily, as efforts were made to establish a European force capable of moving quickly to carry out joint military operations and evacuations from war zones and provide relief when natural disasters occur.

In 2018, French President Emmanuel Macron urged for the establishment of a "real European army" to defend the continent in the face of forces such as Russia, China, and even the United States, saying: "We have to protect ourselves against China, Russia, and even the United States," adding: "We will not protect Europeans unless we decide to have a real European army."

(44) Rob Shmitz, "Facing Trump Pressure, EU Invested More In Own Defence. Will It Continue With Biden?", 2020/11/18: <https://n.pr/3BKXSVz>

Macron thought at the time that Europe should reduce its dependence on American power. He said: "When I see President Trump announcing his withdrawal from a major disarmament agreement concluded in the 1980s after the missile crisis in Europe, who would be the main victim? Europe and its Security". "By confronting Russia at our borders, which has shown it can pose a threat, we need Europe to better defend itself, with more sovereignty, not just rely on the United States," he said<sup>(45)</sup>.

German Chancellor Angela Merkel, then, welcomed the idea of establishing a European "intervention force", suggesting that it should be part of European defence cooperation. London welcomed the idea of an intervention force, but rejected the idea of establishing a European army for fear that it would create a parallel structure to NATO<sup>(46)</sup>.

However, all of that, from Trump's warnings, to the French movement, and the European thinking about military reinforcement, was placed on the shelf, with the world entering the Corona pandemic, which crippled everything, as world countries were struggling for the survival of their citizens.

Moreover; as the world was emerging from the Corona pandemic and starting to address its disastrous effects on the economy and reviewing the plans that had been made before the spread of the pandemic, the Russian invasion of Ukraine came to reopen all files, foremost of which is the file of a strong Europe capable of defending itself. This time; however, Britain had become outside the European Union; which meant that things would be easier to develop more understanding within the Union.

In the new "Russian-Ukrainian" conflict, the American role appeared early. Washington was leading the West in the pre-war phase. In early February 2022, the US administration, in cooperation with the British government, issued intelligence reports warning of an imminent and strongly likely attack on Ukraine, and the US administration has obtained commitments from France and Germany in this regard<sup>(47)</sup>. Talking about the British government means talking about a country that is closer to Washington in foreign policy than it is to the EU, before and after Brexit.

(45) «Macron advocates the creation of a European army in the face of Russia, China and even the United States», France 2018/11/06, 24: <https://bit.ly/2ACAk5z>

(46) 'France's Macron pushes for 'true European army'', BBC, 2018/11/6: <https://bbc.in/2PLejdB>

(47) Georgina Wright and Alexander Cooley, "The Ukraine Moment in Transatlantic Relations... and Then What?", 2022/10/28: <https://bit.ly/3FXEWp0>

It can be said that from the very beginning of the war, the “Euro-American” alliance showed seriousness, rigor and durability, as the Russian invasion had to be repulsed. Political statements, as well as Western media reports, focused on traditional Atlantic unity and strong coordination against Russia.

The European Union; however, did not forget Trump's statements, which were like a reprimand, nor did some of its leaders and officials forget what they were planning before the Corona pandemic, regarding pushing for independence from the United States. Thus, the Russian invasion came as a warning saying: now is the right time.

With the onset of the war, the EU began to change its military strategy. It increased its defence budget, supported Kiev with lethal weapons and sought energy independence. All those measures were previously discussed.

However, as the first months of the war passed, it appeared that Washington was ahead of the European Union in the volume of support provided to Ukraine. Although the countries of the Union were aware that such American support was necessary to repel the Russian invasion in a war that could expand at any moment and other European countries might intervene in it, they sought to take the lead on the subject of aid.

Indeed, as of October 2022<sup>3</sup>, and as we mentioned previously, the military aid in terms of weapons and equipment, which Washington pledged to provide to Kyiv since January 24, amounted to more than 27\$ billion, which makes it superior to all European aid combined, followed by The United Kingdom, which in the same period pledged to provide about four billion dollars<sup>(48)</sup>. By November 2022<sup>20</sup>, EU aid surpassed US aid to Ukraine, according to data from January 24 to November 2022. By November 2022<sup>20, 20</sup>, EU member states' total military, financial, and humanitarian assistance amounted to 52€ billion, with Germany being Europe's largest donor, and by the same date, US assistance amounted to 48€ billion<sup>(49)</sup>. The significant rise in the European figure is the result of the 18€ billion that the EU agreed to grant Ukraine in 2023 in the form of loans<sup>(50)</sup>.

(48) Katharina Buchholz, “Where Military Aid to Ukraine Comes From”, Statista, 2022/11/10: <https://bit.ly/3UKkBru>

(49) Ukraine Support Tracker, Kiel Institute for the World Economy, <https://bit.ly/3uH5yUP>

(50) «Council adopts 18€ billion assistance to Ukraine», European Council, 2022/12/10: <https://bit.ly/3BJuBus>



If France led European endeavours to strengthen the Union militarily, and to become independent from Washington; Germany - France's partner in leading the Union - and the first European power, began a new policy towards Russia after the latter's invasion of Ukraine; especially, when Germany had been close to Russia, with its will being close to Europe. Thus, Berlin sought substantial military investment, for the first time since World War II, as we mentioned earlier, in a measure that strengthens the European Union and thus its independence.

On the other hand, it must be mentioned that transatlantic tension did not end with Trump's exit from the White House, as problems occurred during the era of his democratic successor Joe Biden, such as the anarchic withdrawal from Afghanistan in August 2021, and the crisis of the nuclear submarines deal<sup>(51)</sup>.

Recently, disagreements between the US administration and the European Union on the trade issue have escalated, as presented during Macron's visit to Washington in late November 2022, where he sought to avoid conflict between the two sides of the Atlantic.

The EU is concerned about the repercussions of the 369\$ billion inflation-reduction plan approved by Biden, which includes reforms that give preference to US-based companies.

European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen said on Dec. 4 that the EU should take action to remove competition glitches resulting from U.S. subsidies through Biden's inflation-reduction plan<sup>(52)</sup>.

On 7 November, the French Minister of Finance had called on the European Union to join forces to confront Washington, noting that the United States was supporting its companies through new tax legislation, which was affecting the competitiveness of European industry<sup>(53)</sup>.

(51) Australia angered France in September 2021, when it abruptly cancelled a 35€ billion deal, with the French company to build a fleet of nuclear submarines. Canberra replaced the deal with France with a deal with the United States and Britain, known as the Oaks deal. Last June, however, Australia announced a 555€ million settlement in favor of the French group Naval as compensation for the cancellation of a submarine deal with Paris.

(52) «EU chief says bloc must act over US subsidies plan», 2022/12/4: DW, <https://bit.ly/3v1y11f>

(53) Wilhelmine Preussen, “Le Maire: Europe must stand firm against US aid to industry”, Politico, 2022/11/7: <https://politi.co/3FEEv1u>



Another subject of concern to the European Union is the "American-Chinese" conflict, in various fields. The Union does not want to pay the price of that conflict, as if it were attached to US policies, but rather seeks to be independent in this field, with a country like China, which is indispensable for cooperation with it, especially since it is in an increasing estrangement with Russia, and it is not in the EU's interest to boycott both countries.

Before last November's US midterm elections, some observers thought that the results of those elections might contribute to determining the future of US support for Ukraine in its war, and thus how the EU would be involved. But the election struck a balance between the Republican and Democratic parties, with the former controlling the House of Representatives, which was under the control of the Democrats, and the latter remaining in control of the Senate's decision. Thus, Ukraine's support decision has become a bipartisan partnership, which may create obstacles.

Nonetheless; the EU seems to be aware that it must continue its quest to strengthen its independence from Washington, especially since the US administration may change in 2024, and even Trump himself, who does not like supporting Europe and likes Putin, may return to the White House.

In conclusion, the EU now has a real chance to strengthen itself and reduce dependence on Washington, thereby achieving a more balanced "Euro-American" alliance. Will the EU take this opportunity all the way?

## Fourth: Anticipated Scenarios

The thorny dossiers imposed by the Russian invasion of Ukraine are multi-dimensional. The political, economic and military dimensions, drawn by the current war in Europe, are intertwined. Some of these dimensions are strategic and can be loaded with much analysis regarding the future.

Although it is difficult to anticipate the next stages in a war that is still changing around the clock in the field and interacting in the corridors of politics, it is possible to talk, based on everything that has been discussed previously, about several possible scenarios in military strategy, energy policies and transatlantic relations, which are originally based on two main tracks: the path of the end of the war soon, and the path of its long duration.

### Track 1: The close end of the war

In the event that the war in Ukraine ends soon, due to a Russian withdrawal from the battle, or arriving at endeavours that produce reconciliation or peace, or certain international understandings taking place through which Moscow can emerge with a face-saving exit, the sub- scenarios presented are the following:

#### 1- Military strategy:

The European Union has taken many steps in order to strengthen its military power, first against the backdrop of the war in Ukraine; secondly, because this matter began years ago but blocked by the Corona pandemic. Now, it seems that the EU is back collectively and individually to work on investing more in its defence policies parting with a decades' policy of being under the protection of the United States and NATO. Ending the war soon; however, could cause some laxity, that might slow down, but not cancel, plans for strategic military transformation.

## 2- Energy Policies:

The future of energy policies in the European Union is not only related to the ongoing war, but rather to the feeling of the Union, seriously, for the first time in many years, of the need for independence from Russia in this framework, and the strengthening of renewable energy. It seems that what the EU has done with regard to renewable energy since the beginning of the war in Ukraine will encourage Member States to move forward in this field due to its strategic importance. This remains a possibility; however, the chances for progress in this regard remain slim every day, as the EU might return to relying on Russia for a large part of its energy resources in the event of a peaceful solution between the parties. The difficulty in this matter lies in the EU not wanting to go backwards; although a number of member states may prefer not to abandon Russia as a source of energy.

## 3- Transatlantic relations:

The evolution of these relations, up or down, depends on the ruling forces of both parties, now and in the future. If the war ends soon, the EU is likely to remain steadfast to its intention of independence from American protection; however, it will not put too much pressure on its defence investment. Therefore, its independence movement may be slow and lax.

## The second track: The long lasting of the war:

In the event that all political and diplomatic endeavours to put an end to the war fail, so as it drags on and on perhaps years, the sub-scenarios presented are the following:

### 1- Military strategy:

With regard to military strategy, what was put forward in the scenario of the end of the war applies, in terms of the European Union's determination to strengthen its defence force. As it continues; however, the Union's resolve will not slow down, but it will strengthen its military power more rapidly. The Union is expected to develop its defence facilities and institutions, investing more money. Moreover, Member States will invest significantly in strengthening their armies.



## 2- Energy Policies:

Concerning energy policies, the rationales mentioned in the scenario of the quick end of the war, parallel those applied in the long-time war scenario; because the European Union seems determined to strengthen its power and independence in the field of energy. The continuation of the war will, of course, prevent any slowness in this regard, and encourage the rapid development of renewable energy, based on the plans outlined by European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen on 12 December; because the war will impose fiscal pressures, making affordable renewable energy all the more necessary.

## 3- Transatlantic relations:

The longer the war lasts, the more major EU powers feel the need to match the US power on the Ukrainian subject. Thus, the Union will work at a rapid pace to achieve independence from Washington, especially on the military issue, and will work in parallel to strengthen its role in the "Atlantic Alliance", specifically through the application of the 2% defence budget.

Three major issues relevant to the prolonged war scenario should be mentioned:

1

First, if the war continues and expands, it could create problems within the European Union. Not all member States would be able to adhere to strict, unified policies, which could create divisions, much like the one between the Justice Camp, which wants to hold Moscow accountable at all costs, and the Peace Camp, which wants to end the war even at the expense of Ukraine.

2

The second relates to Ukraine's support in a long war, which will impose significant costs on the EU, affecting many sectors within the member states. By extension, Ukraine's entry into the European Union (some 44 million people) will pose new challenges to the Union.

3

The third relates to the state of expansion of the war and the entry of other States into it, or its evolution towards the use of nuclear weapons, as armaments in the European Union will then overwhelm all other sectors, and the main funding and investment of industry will go to armaments equipment, as happened during the Second World War.

A final scenario, which may not necessarily be associated with a short war or a long war, remains the fall of Kiev and most of Ukraine to the Russians. Here, most of the conditions for a long war will apply to the European Union's endeavours, and things will be open to all possibilities, from a wide war to a long peace.

# Conclusion

In the end, from the very first day of Russia's invasion of Ukraine, the EU exerted intensive efforts in support of Kiev, which, together with American support, helped it to steadfast. However; if the battle scales on Ukrainian soil are marred by so many complexities, as the picture is still not quite clear; what is quite clear throughout is that the efforts of the European Union, or most of its states, to bring about strategic changes, have been put on track. Arguably, the European Union has brought about a quasi-revolution to change its military strategy and its traditional energy policies; and it is also likely to make progress in changing the pattern of its relations with Washington.